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A PRIMER ON ANTITRUST DAMAGES 
(revised) 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
 
Introduction: Antitrust Damages Actions and Social Welfare 
 
 The Role of Efficiency in Damages Theory 
 
 The marriage between economics and federal antitrust policy becomes rocky when it 
reaches the law of damages. With the exception of market definition issues, most of the 
economics applied in substantive antitrust analysis is conceptual and written by academics who 
were not contemplating litigation. By contrast, an economically sophisticated law of damages 
requires empirical studies to be made within the context of litigation and with specific application 
to the facts placed before the court. For the economist, empirical studies invariably mean 
statistics, regression analysis and other forms of higher mathematics. The result can be a 
nightmare for the judge, who must ultimately instruct the jury in such a way that their decision 
will not be arbitrary. 
 
 Certain complexities in the law of damages limit the contribution of theoretical economics. 
The economics revolution in antitrust has been concerned chiefly with the "quality" of antitrust 
injury. It has helped policy makers determine when certain practices, such as vertical integration, 
are beneficial to society and when they are harmful; or alternatively, whether the plaintiff is 
complaining about anticompetitiveness or efficiency. But the law of damages has the much more 
difficult task of quantifying injury; the difference between saying that a certain practice is harmful 
and quantifying the amount of harm can be significant. 
 
 Most of the law continues to be based on concepts of justice and compensation that are 
inconsistent with any notion that the purpose of antitrust enforcement (including private 
enforcement) is to deter conduct only to the extent that it is inefficient. But the economics 
revolution in the substantive law of antitrust cannot be ignored in the law of damages, or nearly 
everything given by one hand will be taken back by the other. The availability and amount of 
damages determines the amount of antitrust enforcement that exists. More importantly, it affects 
the cost-benefit calculus any firm undertakes when it considers whether to undertake a risky, 
probably efficient practice whose legality is uncertain and which is likely to injure certain 
competitors. The great majority of antitrust cases are filed by private plaintiffs,1 and most of these 
include a damage claim. As a result, most antitrust enforcement comes from private parties whose 
personal motive is not optimal efficiency or the maximization of consumer wealth, but rather their 
own economic gain. 
 
                                                        
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
 
1 See the data cited in Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: the Law of Competition and 
its Practices § 16.1 n.7 (4th ed. 2011) (forthcoming). 
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 The basic economic ideology of antitrust policy today is that antitrust should maximize the 
wealth of society by condemning practices when they permit inefficient output reductions and 
price increases, and by approving practices when they are competitive. With respect to damages, 
however, economists have offered antitrust policy makers a far more difficult proposition: that the 
damages for a particular offense should be calculated so as to make the offense unprofitable if it is 
inefficient, but not if it is efficient.2 The "antitrust injury" doctrine developed by the Supreme 
Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc.3 gives ambiguous support for this 
doctrine, although academic writings have carried the doctrine further than anything the Supreme 
Court stated.4 
 
 Many practices alleged to violate the antitrust laws are efficient. Others are inefficient and 
have few socially redeeming virtues. Still others may simultaneously increase both the efficiency 
of the participants and their market power. A perfectly designed antitrust policy would exonerate 
the first set of practices, condemn the second set, and condemn the third set only when the social 
cost of the restraint exceeds its social value. A theory of damages based on the same principle 
would make them unprofitable when they are inefficient but leave them alone when they are not. 
 
Deterrence and Damages 
 
 One superficially plausible way of making damages measurement easier is to establish a 
relatively high floor for damage recoveries and no ceiling. If all presumptions were in the 
plaintiff's favor, if the rankest speculation was permitted to go to the jury, and all ambiguities were 
resolved in favor of the plaintiff's estimates, we could confidently predict that damages would 
always be large enough to deter the violations. The same result might be achieved by establishing 
a scale of very high minimum damages, or by changing the multiplier—say, from treble damages 
to tenfold damages. 
 
                                                        
2 See  William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Penalty Reform: An Economic Analysis 3–
29 (1986); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U.Chi.L.Rev. 652 
(1983); Herbert Hovenkamp, Treble Damages Reform, 33 Antitrust Bull. 233 (1988).  On the 
relative value of private and public antitrust enforcement in achieving optimal enforcement, see 
Randolph Preston McAfee, Hugh M. Mialon & Sue Mialon, Private v. Public Antitrust 
Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis, 92 J.Pub.Econ. 1863 (2008); Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. 
David, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Anaysis of Forty Cases, 42 USF L.Rev. 
879 (2008); Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust 
Law: A Survey (Stanford Working Paper, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952067. 
 
3  429 U.S. 477, 97 S.Ct. 690 (1977). 
 
4 For example, see William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach 
to Antitrust Injury, 47 U.Chi.L.Rev. 467 (1980). 
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 If antitrust enforcement by means of damages actions were costless, if courts never made 
an error in identifying a certain activity as an antitrust violation, and if all antitrust violations so 
identified were inefficient, without compensating efficiencies, then a case could be made for 
penalties far in excess of the expected profitability of any illegal act.5  Such high penalties would 
certainly deter. Further, when deterrence is costless and never deters an efficient practice, then 
overdeterrence is not a substantial social concern. 
 
 If any one of the above propositions fails to obtain, however, deterrence itself becomes a 
socially costly commodity. Private antitrust enforcement is not costless, but in fact quite 
expensive. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that it is subject to declining marginal 
utility and increasing marginal cost. If there were only a small amount of enforcement it would be 
directed at egregious, probably per se violations, such as price fixing, which are relatively easy to 
prove. As the law provides for increasing amounts of enforcement (perhaps by increasing the 
damages multiplier), however, the enforcers will attempt to reach increasingly marginal activity 
whose social costs are more ambiguous. Furthermore, proving a violation and injury in such 
circumstances will cost more. As the amount of enforcement increases the benefits may continue 
to increase, but at a decreasing rate. Likewise, as the amount of enforcement increases the costs 
will rise at an increasing rate. Eventually the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves will 
intersect. Enforcement beyond that point would be inefficient: the amount of social gain claimed 
by the additional enforcement would be less than the additional costs of providing it.6 
                                                        
5 In a public enforcement system the large fine may reduce enforcement costs, because fewer 
prosecutions would be necessary to achieve a given level of deterrence. For example, a one in ten 
chance of paying a $1000 fine should theoretically have about the same deterrent effect as a one in 
one thousand chance of paying a $100,000 fine. If people are not risk neutral and transaction 
costs are positive, however, some care must be taken in determining the proper trade-off between 
the probability and the size of an expected penalty. See William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, 
Antitrust Penalty Reform: an Economic Analysis 7 (1986); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Amer.Econ.Rev. 880 
(1979); Michael K. Block and J. Gregory Sidak, Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then? 68 
Geo.L.J. 1131 (1980). 
In a private enforcement system such as that created by § 4 of the Clayton Act, however, 
an increase in the size of the expected fine will increase, not decrease, the probability of having to 
pay the fine, because there would be more private enforcement. More private plaintiffs would 
bring actions, for as the expected return rises more lawsuits at the margin would become 
profitable. In short, there would very likely not be a "trade-off" between the probability and the 
magnitude of the expected penalty at all, but both would increase together. Of course, some other 
mechanism could be used to reduce the amount of private enforcement, such as narrowing 
standing to a smaller group of people or radically shortening the limitation period. But calibrating 
damages by such methods would almost certainly be impossible. 
 
6 See Kenneth G. Elzinga & William Breit, The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and 
Economics 9–12 (1976).  
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Figure 1 shows the marginal social cost of deterrence (the sum of all costs to the enforcer, 
the defendant and the rest of society) rising and the marginal social benefit (the sum of all benefits 
to both the private plaintiff and the rest of society) falling. The optimal amount of deterrence is 
point 0. Any enforcement beyond point 0 would yield a higher degree of competition, but the 
social value of the greater competition would be outweighed by the social cost of the additional 
deterrence. 
 
 An optimal antitrust enforcement policy would enforce to the point that the marginal cost 
of enforcement equaled the marginal benefit. However, locating the intersection of marginal 
enforcement cost and marginal benefit is possible only in a vague and most general way. At the 
extreme, some people have argued that the cost of any amount of private enforcement exceeds its 
benefit—that is, that the marginal social cost curve never intersects the marginal social benefit 
curve at all, but is higher at all places.7 This would be true if inefficient antitrust violations never 
occurred, or if the costs of proving the existence of even a simple price fixing conspiracy were 
higher than the amount of social benefit that condemnation of the conspiracy would produce. 
 
 But others believe that the current level of antitrust enforcement falls short of the 
intersection with marginal benefit—that society would be wealthier if there were more antitrust 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
7 For example, William F. Shughart II, Private Antitrust Enforcement: Compensation, Deterrence, 
or Extortion, available at https://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv13n3/reg13n3–
shughart.html. A somewhat more moderate position is Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A 
Policy at War With Itself (1978; rev. ed. 1993). 
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enforcement. They would propose more enforcement, usually by means such as broader rules of 
standing, damages actions for indirect purchasers, broader parens patriae actions, easier and more 
frequent use of class actions, changes in certain presumptions and burdens of proof, more rules of 
per se illegality, and perhaps even changing the damages multiplier from treble to some higher 
number.8 
 
 Even if courts could identify antitrust violations with absolute precision and every activity 
branded as an antitrust violation were inefficient, an unlimited amount of enforcement would 
nevertheless against violations not be optimal. Sooner or later the cost of enforcement would 
exceed the benefits. 
 
 The social costs of enforcement loom larger when we consider that courts are not always 
able accurately to distinguish competitive from anticompetitive conduct. The more private 
enforcement there is, the more likely that the enforcement, at the margin, will be in areas where 
courts are prone to error. For example, predatory pricing is a "marginal" offense. The costs of 
litigating it are relatively high, as is the likelihood that the court will make an error.9  A likely 
result is many potential defendants (not merely the ones involved in litigation) avoid aggressive 
pricing for fear of litigating a predatory pricing case, even though they might eventually win. 
Although the antitrust laws provide costs and attorneys fees for prevailing plaintiffs, they make no 
similar provision for prevailing defendants. The social cost of the rule against predatory pricing 
must include not only the costs of litigating the two or three cases in which predation is proved, 
but also the dozens of cases in which the defendants eventually prevail. The more ambiguous the 
offense, the larger these costs become. 
 
Using Damages to Minimize the Social Cost of Antitrust Violations 
 
 As Gary Becker once observed, the costs of harmful conduct and the system of preventing 
it are of three kinds: 1) the costs imposed by the conduct itself; 2) the costs of detecting, 
apprehending and determining the guilt of alleged violators; 3) the costs of imposing sanctions on 
                                                        
8 E.g., Robert H. Lande, Multiple Enforcers and Multiple Remedies: Why Antitrust Damage 
Levels Should be Raised, 16 Loy.Consumer L.Rev. 329 (2004); Lawrence A. Sullivan, 
Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the Transformation of the Law, 60 
Tex.L.Rev. 587 (1982); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U.Pa.L.Rev. 
1051 (1979). See also Spencer Weber Waller, Private Law, Punishment and Disgorgement: the 
Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 207 (2003) (arguing that there is no 
more than a random relationship between current treble damages awards and optimal penalty). In 
the special context of merger enforcement, see Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private 
Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1 
(1995) (arguing for broader private plaintiff standing in numerous areas). 
 
9 See Ch. 8. 
 
Hovenkamp Antitrust Damages    February, 2011, Page 6 
 
condemned violators.10   An optimal antitrust policy would minimize the sum of these three costs. 
However, the costs are not independent of each other. Sometimes one cost will rise as another 
declines. For example, the substantive law of antitrust is calculated so as to minimize costs of the 
first type: a well-designed antitrust policy will condemn socially costly acts and approve socially 
beneficial ones. By contrast, the per se rule is designed to minimize costs of the second type—in 
this case, the costs of operating the system that determines when the antitrust laws have been 
violated. Expansive use of per se rules (either of legality or illegality) might well reduce costs of 
the second type substantially; however, the reduction would probably cause an increase in costs of 
the first type. For example, if too many practices are declared per se legal without elaborate 
inquiry into their rationale and likely effect, underdeterrence and socially costly antitrust violations 
will be encouraged. By contrast, if too expansive a rule of per se illegality is used, the result will 
be overdeterrence and some socially beneficial practices will be condemned. 
 
 The same thing generally applies to punishment costs. Too expansive a law of damages 
will encourage too many private plaintiff filings, give plaintiffs an incentive to litigate longer, and 
to hold out for higher settlements. The result will be increased costs of the second type. At the 
same time, an overexpansive law of damages and the excessive filings caused thereby will 
dissuade firms from engaging in competitive practices calculated to injure competitors but which 
might later be characterized as antitrust violations. This will also increase costs of the first type. 
The greater the room for misinterpretation, or the greater the uncertainty about the law, the 
greater these social costs become. 
 
 Finally, antitrust law, just as all other areas of law, must deal with the problem of marginal 
deterrence.11   Deterrence works because people find certain kinds of punishment unpleasant, and 
some kinds more unpleasant than others. For example, large fines are less pleasant than small fines 
and long prison sentences are less pleasant for most people than short ones. The marginal 
deterrence argument says, quite simply, that if both robbery and murder are punishable by death, 
the person who has just committed a robbery will have no disincentive to kill his victim as well. 
The chances of detection might be less once the victim is out of the way, and the punishment will 
be no greater. By contrast, if robbery is punishable by ten years in prison and murder by death, 
then the person who has just committed a robbery will be forced to balance the decreased chances 
of detection that might result from killing the victim against the greatly increased expected cost of 
punishment.12 
                                                        
10 Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.Pol.Econ. 169, 181 (1968); 
an application of Becker's argument to antitrust damages actions is Warren F. Schwartz, An 
Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 Geo.L.J. 1075 (1980). 
 
11 For the history of marginal deterrence in the common law tradition, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 305 (1993). 
 
12 See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Law, 78 J.Pol.Econ. 526, 527 (1970); 
Block and Sidak, note __ at 1134. 
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 The marginal deterrence argument applies to antitrust. For example, there is probably a 
correlation between the size of a cartel's monopoly overcharge and the chance of detection: a 
cartel which pushes the price of widgets from a competitive level of $1.00 to $1.20 is less likely to 
be detected than a cartel that pushes the price up to $2.50.13  Since private damages actions yield 
three times the monopoly overcharge, the "fine" that a violator must pay if it is caught will be 
substantially larger if the price increase is larger. When the cartel members calculate the increased 
probability of detection and the increased size of the expected fine, they may well decide to be 
content with the relatively small $1.20 cartel price. The result is that the cartel will probably 
impose smaller losses on society.14  However, if all instances of price fixing were punished by a 
fine of $1,000,000, then the cartel would consider only the increased likelihood of detection and 
might well conclude that the larger monopoly overcharge would be better. If the probability of 
detection does not vary with the amount of the overcharge, a uniform fine of $1,000,000 would 
give the cartel no legal incentive to charge a lower rather than a higher cartel price. 
 
The Optimal Deterrence Model for Antitrust Damages 
 
Victim's Losses v. Violator's Gains 
 
 The rationale for private antitrust damage actions could be either compensation or 
deterrence. The goal of an enforcement system based on compensation is to restore injured parties 
to their position had the violation not occurred. The goal of an enforcement system based on 
deterrence is to identify some optimal level of violations that should be eliminated, and make that 
level of violations unprofitable by imposing costs on prospective violators. 
 
 An economic model for assessing the optimal level of antitrust damages will employ a 
deterrence rationale, making conduct unprofitable precisely to the extent that it is inefficient. As a 
result, there is a correlation between the expected profitability of harmful conduct and the proper 
measure of damages needed to deter it. 
 
 But there may be little correlation between the expected profitability of inefficient conduct 
and the amount of harm caused to injured plaintiffs. For example, the profitability of predatory 
pricing depends on the number of sales that the successful predator eventually makes at a 
monopoly price, multiplied by the amount of the monopoly overcharge.15  This number likely 
                                                        
13 See Michael K. Block, F.C. Nold & J. Gregory Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 89 J.Pol.Econ. 429, 431 (1981). 
 
14 However, the social cost of a cartel includes 1) the monopoly deadweight loss; 2) the cartel's 
enforcement costs; and 3) the length of time the cartel exists. If (3) goes up as (1) goes down, the 
welfare effect of the change may not be positive. 
 
15 On predatory pricing, see 3A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Ch. 7C 
(3d ed. 2008). 
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bears no relation to the losses suffered by the competitor driven out of business by the predation. 
There may be a better correlation between the profitability of the post-predation monopoly pricing 
and the amount of the injury to the monopolist's customers. Here, however, the monopoly profits 
must be reduced by the costs that the predator encountered during the predatory period. The 
consumer's overcharge injuries reflect no such discount. 
 
 Courts have not often taken sides in the theoretical battle over whether compensation or 
deterrence should be the goal of private antitrust enforcement. The Supreme Court has said that 
both compensation and deterrence are legitimate goals of private treble damages actions.16  But 
the goals of compensation and deterrence are inconsistent with each other, certainly in the face of 
our present system of legal rules and the high costs of enforcement. Forced payment of 
compensation, multiplied by three, to every person who could show he was injured by an antitrust 
violation would almost certainly yield outrageous overdeterrence. By contrast, optimal deterrence 
can be achieved only by our refusal to compensate some people whose injuries were in fact caused 
by antitrust violations.17 
 
 In the vast majority of litigated cases, damages are assessed and computed in ways far 
more consistent with a compensation model than with any deterrence model.18 
 
Optimal Damages for Overcharge Injuries 
 
 Consider first the relatively simple situation of the single-firm monopolist charging its 
short-run profit-maximizing price. In Figure 2 (on the following page), the competitive price 
would be Pc and output Qc, but the monopolist reduces output to Qm and raises price to Pm. 
Rectangle 2–3–5–4 represents a wealth transfer from consumers to the monopolist, while triangle 
4–5–6 represents the traditional "deadweight loss" caused by the monopolist's output reduction. 
Traditionally economists have identified triangle 4–5–6 as the social cost of monopoly, while they 
have considered rectangle 2–3–5–4 as a transfer payment that has no effect on the overall wealth 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
16 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314, 98 S.Ct. 584, 588 (1978); 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485–86, 97 S.Ct. 690, 695–96 
(1977). The Court stated a stronger preference for deterrence in Hoffman–La Roche, Ltd. v. 
Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 169, 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2369 (2004), on remand, 388 F.3d 337 
(D.C.Cir.2004) (expressing concern that foreign plaintiff actions would interfere with 
government's cartel detection programs); and also in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 
746, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2075 (1977) (stating that the two-thirds of the treble damages above the 
compensatory amount were designed to supplement public enforcement by the creation of 
"private attorneys general." 
 
17 See Warren F. Schwartz, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: An Economic Critique 
28–32 (1981). 
 
18 See the discussion infra.. 
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of society.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If the demand curve is perfectly linear and the firm's marginal costs are constant, line 3–5 
is the same length as line 5–6, and the deadweight loss triangle is precisely one half the size of the 
wealth transfer rectangle.20 Assuming the rectangle represents $1000, the monopoly makes the 
monopolist $1000 richer, the customers who continue to buy $1000 poorer, and generates a lost 
value, which does not accrue to anyone, of $500. 
 
 Assume that the antitrust laws give an action for treble damages and that the possibility of 
detection and successful prosecution is precisely 1 in 3. The expected costs of a violation to a 
violator are the amount of damages times the damages "multiplier" (3, in the case of the federal 
antitrust laws) multiplied again by the likelihood that the violator will have to pay the damages, in 
this case 1/3. In this hypothetical case the damages multiplier and the risk of detection cancel each 
other out and the expected cost of the violation will equal whatever damages the legal rule 
compels. This analysis initially ignores the cost to the defendant of litigating the antitrust claim, 
and of paying the plaintiff's costs and attorney's fees if the plaintiff should prevail. 
 
                                                        
19 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy §§ 1.2–1.3 (4th ed. 2011) (forthcoming). 
 
20 This is because if the demand curve is linear, the marginal revenue curve will also be linear and 
its slope will be exactly double that of the demand curve.  Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy § 
1.2. 
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 Even though triangle 4–5–6 is the efficiency loss created by the monopoly, a damages 
policy designed to maximize efficiency would not set damages equal to the deadweight loss 
triangle: that is, the optimal rule would not require the defendant merely to pay damages equal to 
the social cost of his activity. The expected cost of the violation on that basis is $500, while the 
expected gain from the activity is $1000. The violator will engage in the activity even though it is 
socially costly. The damages payment is a transfer payment made after the fact. If the social cost 
of this monopoly is $500, payment of the $500 to the plaintiff does not in any way correct or 
"eliminate" the social cost of the monopoly. The purpose of the deterrence model is to ensure that 
an inefficient monopoly will never occur in the first place. 
 
 By contrast, a rule that measured damages by either the amount that the violator gained or 
by the amount that purchasers lost would reduce the expected value of the monopolization to 
zero. In this case, if the expected level of the fine were $1001.00 no profit-maximizing firm would 
engage in the illegal activity.21 
 
 The problem becomes more complicated when we consider a possibility that is frequently 
addressed in earlier chapters of this book: that an antitrust violation simultaneously increases both 
the efficiency and the market power of the participants. For example, a horizontal merger or joint 
venture involving firms that dominate a relevant market may give the firms the power to increase 
price by reducing output. At the same time, it may permit them to lower their costs. Courts are 
generally incapable of "balancing" the increased market power that might arise in such 
circumstances against the increased efficiencies. Rather, they condemn mergers and joint ventures 
that create a substantial danger of monopoly pricing, and generally ignore offsetting efficiencies, 
except in the clearest circumstances.22 
 
 However, the one person or group of persons arguably in a position to measure the 
efficiencies and assess their value is the participants themselves. This raises the possibility that, 
although the substantive law of antitrust cannot "net out" efficiencies and increased market 
power, perhaps the law of damages can. Consider Figure 3, which illustrates the consequences of 
a merger or joint venture of competitors that simultaneously gives the participants increased 
market power and increased efficiency. Before the joint venture, the firms faced costs of C2, 
output was equal to Qc, and price equal to Pc. After the inception of the joint venture the firms 
acquire substantial market power, but their average costs drop from C2 to C1. They now 
determine price and output by the intersection of their new, lower marginal cost curve and their 
marginal revenue curve. They reduce output to Qm1 and raise the price to Pm1.23 
                                                        
21 The analysis assumes that the firms are risk neutral. If they are risk averse, a lower fine would 
be sufficient. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the 
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Amer.Econ.Rev. 880 (1979). 
 
22 See 4A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶¶970-976 (3d ed. 2008). 
 
23 See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U.Chi.L.Rev. 652 
(1983). 
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 In this case, triangle 4–5–7 represents the deadweight loss produced by the firms' 
increased market power, while rectangle 2–3–6–5 represents the efficiency gains achieved by their 
increased productive efficiency. The merger or joint venture will be efficient on balance if 
rectangle 2–3–6–5 is larger than triangle 4–5–7.24  The merger is characterized as "efficient" in 
this case even though price Pm1 is higher than price Pc, because the additional cost to consumers is 
merely a wealth transfer, not a social loss. That is, the merger or joint venture may be efficient, 
but most of the benefits of the increased efficiency accrue to the participating firms, not to 
consumers.25 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
24 See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as An Antitrust Defense: the Welfare Trade–Offs, 58 
Amer.Econ.Rev. 18 (1968). 
 
25 However, some of the benefits of the efficiency will accrue to consumers even if price Pm1 is 
higher than price Pc. If no efficiencies were created the market price would be determined by the 
intersection of the original cost curve, C2, and the marginal revenue curve. In that case the 
monopoly price would be Pm2 in Figure 3; and output would be reduced to Qm2. 
 
It is also possible that a merger or joint venture that simultaneously creates market power 
and efficiencies will yield a profit-maximizing price lower than the former, competitive price. This 
would occur when the amount of market power created by the venture is relatively small and the 
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 Suppose that the area of rectangle 1–2–5–4 (the monopoly wealth transfer) is 1000, the 
area of triangle 4–5–7 (the deadweight loss) is 400, and the area of rectangle 2–3–6–5 (the 
efficiency gain) is 500. In this case the gain to the participants from the merger or joint venture is 
1500. The loss to consumers who continue to purchase from the participants is 1000, and the loss 
to consumers who substitute away is 400. Total losses are 1400. On balance, the venture is 
efficient even though consumer losses are substantial. 
 
 If the participants' expected damages are limited to the monopoly overcharge paid by 
customers who continue to buy from the firms, then any cost reduction produced by the venture 
will make the venture profitable. For example, if 1–2–5–4 is $1000, and the expected damages 
award to be paid to consumer plaintiffs is also $1000, then the joint activity will be profitable to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
increased efficiencies are substantial, as Figure 4 illustrates. Many marginally illegal horizontal 
mergers probably fall into this category. For example, under the 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines a merger between a firm with a 20% market share and a firm with a 5% market share 
in a market whose HHI exceeds 1800 would probably be illegal. However, the post-merger firm 
might not exercise substantially more market power than the pre-merger firm. Whether the threat 
of collusion were higher would depend on other factors in the market. See §§ 12.4c, 12.7. If the 
available efficiencies are extraordinarily large, perhaps even a merger to monopoly could yield a 
price reduction. See A.A. Fisher, R.H. Lande, and W. Vandaele, Afterward: Could a Merger Lead 
to Both A Monopoly and a Lower Price? 71 Calif. L.Rev. 1697 (1983). 
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the participants even if the area of rectangle 2–3–6–5 is equal to $1.00. It would not matter that 
the area of the deadweight loss triangle 4–5–7 might be many times $1.00, and thus the net effect 
of the venture inefficient. An expected damages award equal to the overcharge would not deter 
any joint activity that produced an efficiency savings, even if the savings were dwarfed by the 
deadweight loss. 
 
 But suppose that the expected damages is not merely the overcharge, but the sum of the 
overcharge and the deadweight loss: rectangle 1–2–5–4 plus triangle 4–5–7. The venture will be 
profitable to the participants only if rectangle 2–3–6–5 is larger than triangle 4–5–7. Since the 
venture is efficient under the same circumstances, a rule of damages that gave plaintiffs a cause of 
action for the overcharge plus the deadweight loss would make the venture profitable if it were 
efficient, but unprofitable if it were inefficient. Firms would undertake only efficient ventures. For 
example, if the monopoly overcharge rectangle were $1000, the deadweight loss triangle $400, 
and the efficiency gain rectangle $450, the expected damages cost of the venture would be $1400 
but the expected gain would be $1450. The venture would be beneficial to society and profitable 
to the participants. They would pursue the venture. 
 
 As noted above, this assessment of expected damages was premised on the firm's belief 
that the probability of detection and successful prosecution was one in three. Precisely the same 
reasoning would hold if the arrangement was absolutely public, so the probability of "detection" 
were one, but the firms were uncertain about whether the contemplated activity violated the 
antitrust laws. For example, the blanket licensing agreement at issue in Broadcast Music, Inc. 
(BMI) v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.26 was a public price-affecting agreement among 
sellers who were treated as competitors. The arrangement created substantial efficiencies; 
however, it may also have increased the market power of the licensors, and it did permit them to 
price discriminate.27  If ex ante BMI had predicted a one-in-three chance that the blanket licensing 
arrangement would be condemned in an antitrust treble damages action, then it would have 
undertaken the blanket licensing venture anyway if the efficiencies gained by the venture exceeded 
the deadweight loss, assuming that the expected penalty would be based on the overcharge plus 
the deadweight loss. However, if the efficiencies had been less than the deadweight loss, BMI 
would have foregone the venture. In the BMI case there was likely no monopoly overcharge: that 
is, the transactional efficiencies created by the joint venture dwarfed the increased market power 
so substantially that the joint venture's profit-maximizing price for blanket licenses was lower than 
the price that would have existed in a competitive market for individual licensing agreements.28 
                                                        
26 441 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 1551. also National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679, 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978), which involved a public agreement among engineers not to 
bid against each other for contracts; and FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 
411, 110 S.Ct. 768 (1990), which involved a public agreement among public defense lawyers to 
withhold legal services until they received higher fees. In the latter two cases the defendants 
predicted incorrectly that their agreements would not violate the antitrust laws. 
 
27 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy § 5.2 (4th ed. 2011) (forthcoming). 
28 See Figure 4 supra. 
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 At this point it is possible to state a general rule: the best measure of damages for 
overcharge injuries caused by monopoly pricing should equal the amount of the overcharge plus 
the deadweight loss. This should be the proper amount even if the agreement among the firms is 
naked price fixing with no efficiency creation whatsoever. In that case, overdeterrence is not a 
problem. However, the creation of any efficiency will throw upon the defendants the obligation to 
compare the efficiency gains produced by their venture against the social losses. Such a rule 
would permit efficient conduct, even if the conduct is an antitrust violation, but would effectively 
deter inefficient antitrust violations. 
 
 If the costs of litigation, including attorney's fees, are considered, the basic analysis 
remains the same. Since prevention and enforcement costs are a deadweight loss, the effect of 
inclusion of these costs is simply to enlarge the deadweight loss that must be balanced against the 
efficiency gains. For example, if the monopoly overcharge is $1000, deadweight loss from 
monopoly pricing $400, litigation costs and attorney's fees $50, and efficiency savings $500, the 
efficiency savings will exceed the sum of deadweight loss and enforcement costs by $50 and the 
agreement will be profitable. However, if the anticipated litigation costs exceed $100, the 
agreement will not be profitable; likewise, it would be inefficient. This suggests that the rule 
requiring defendants to pay costs and attorneys' fees is correct. 
 
Optimal Damages for Exclusionary Practices 
 
 
 An "exclusionary practice" is designed by the perpetrator to discipline or exclude rivals so 
that it can attain or maintain monopoly power. These practices include monopolization and 
attempt to monopolize, predatory pricing, some concerted refusals to deal and tying arrangements 
in which the effect is to exclude a rival from the market for the tied product, exclusive dealing, 
and other forms of vertical integration including vertical restraints. These restraints have in 
common that they may drive another firm out of business, prevent it from expanding output, or 
deter it from entering in the first place. The optimal deterrence model suggests that these practices 
should be condemned if they gave the perpetrator the ability to earn monopoly profits and there 
were no compensating efficiencies. 
 
 But exclusionary practices may be efficient. Further, they may simultaneously be efficient 
and increase the market power of the participating firms. Courts cannot easily distinguish between 
competitive and anticompetitive exclusionary behavior, however. Allegations of predatory pricing 
are often complaints about greater efficiency resulting in lower prices.29  Tying arrangements, 
refusals to deal, exclusive dealing and territorial division might all be mechanisms by which a firm 
improves the efficiency of its production or distribution system. All these practices are efficient if 
the gains from the increased efficiency exceed any deadweight loss caused by increased market 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
29 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy § 8.4e. 
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power. By the same token, however, both the increased efficiency and the increased market 
power will impose private costs—the former generally upon competitors, the latter generally upon 
consumers. 
 
 An antitrust policy designed to deter inefficient exclusionary practices but permit efficient 
"exclusionary" practices would assess penalties by looking at the net welfare effect of the practice. 
Although a court could not quantify efficiency and market power and balance them, the law of 
damages could arguably be used to shift the obligation to balance to the defendant. If the penalty 
is the monopoly overcharge plus the monopoly deadweight loss, the practice will be unprofitable 
if the deadweight loss is greater than the resulting efficiencies, but profitable if the deadweight 
loss is less than the efficiencies. In short, the damages rule should be the same in exclusionary 
practices cases as it is in overcharge cases. 
 
 The optimal deterrence model's application to the law of exclusionary practices is thus a 
radical departure from the existing law of damages. Under all prevailing antitrust damages rules 
for exclusionary practices in lawsuits brought by competitors, the measure of damages is based on 
the plaintiff's business losses, not on the defendant's monopoly gains and the size of the 
deadweight loss. Indeed, there is probably no useful correlation between the amount of an injured 
competitor's lost profits and other consequential damages, and the amount of the monopoly 
overcharge and deadweight loss caused by the defendant. An efficient practice, which produced 
no monopoly overcharge and deadweight loss at all, and an inefficient, monopolizing practice 
might both drive a competing firm out of business. The victim's losses might be precisely the same 
whether or not the practice was efficient. In one case, however, optimal damages would be zero, 
in the other very large. 
 
 A review of the discussion of the social cost of monopoly in § 1.3 suggests why there is 
no useful correlation between the amount of an injured competitor's lost profits and the size of the 
deadweight loss triangle plus the monopoly overcharge. The deadweight loss triangle represents 
the social cost of monopoly pricing—that is, of raising the price to a monopolistic level, with the 
result that certain persons make inefficient substitutions to different products. By contrast, the 
injury to the victim of an exclusionary practice such as predatory pricing is a cost of monopolizing 
conduct. If the anticipated return from a particular monopoly is $1,000,000 per year, the firm will 
be willing to spend any amount up to $1,000,000 per year in acquiring or maintaining its 
monopoly position. Some of this may be spent in inefficient ways, and thus must be included in 
the social cost of monopoly. 
 
 This analysis reveals the highly static nature of the optimal deterrence model. Under the 
model no damages are due until after the defendant has engaged in a certain period of monopoly 
pricing. Suppose a dealer is terminated because its supplier and other suppliers in the same market 
are in the process of forming a cartel, and are using vertical integration to the retail level to 
monitor output prices. The terminated dealer is in a relatively good position to know what is 
going on at the time of its termination. Customer-victims of the cartel may not know until later, 
after the cartel has succeeded in reducing output and raising price. Indeed, they may never know 
at all. However, the terminated dealer would not have an action for damages until the cartel 
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began operating. Furthermore, the longer the terminated dealer waited before it announced the 
existence of the cartel and commenced the lawsuit, the greater the damages would be—i.e., since 
the dealer's damages are measured by the injury suffered by other members of society (customers 
of the cartel) and its own losses are already sunk, the dealer would have an incentive to have 
those damages be as large as possible. 
 
 One radical solution to this problem is to eliminate competitor lawsuits altogether.30  If the 
only activities that should be illegal under the antitrust laws are those that are calculated to result 
in monopoly performance, and if the optimal damages for all instances of monopoly performance 
equal the overcharge plus the deadweight loss, then the best enforcers of the antitrust laws in all 
instances are customers. Although this might result in a much more efficient level of antitrust 
enforcement within a static model, it would also eliminate the entire "early warning" system that is 
now facilitated by competitor lawsuits.31 
 
 The "early warning" argument cannot be disregarded. The kind of monopoly with which 
antitrust is concerned is generally "short-run," or of finite duration. Its social cost is a function of 
its duration. Competitor victims of exclusionary practices are often injured long before consumers 
are—particularly in cases involving such practices as predatory pricing, where the competitor 
injury occurs during one time period and consumer injury occurs only later. Further, competitors 
and other non-consumers, such as terminated employees, are often in a position to detect antitrust 
violations that may never be detected by consumers.32  These are values of non-consumer lawsuits 
that cannot be disregarded, notwithstanding that competitors often have the wrong set of 
incentives.33 
 
 The optimal deterrence model for exclusionary practices has other, more analytic 
shortcomings. It is based on a low estimate of the social cost of monopoly. As § 1.3 noted, the 
social cost of the kind of monopoly that concerns antitrust consists of three parts: 1) the 
monopoly "deadweight" loss; 2) the expenses that the monopolizing firm incurs in excluding 
rivals; and 3) the loss of irreversible investment made by wrongfully excluded rivals. The optimal 
deterrence model as stated takes costs of the first two types into account, but not costs of the 
third type. A properly defined model should include the costs to all of the victims of a 
monopolistic practice except those costs that are incurred by the violator. 
 
                                                        
30 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U.Chi.L.Rev. 263, 
331 (1981), which proposes this rule for predatory pricing cases; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, 
On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 972 (1986). 
 
31 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 31 (1989). 
 
32 See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, § 16.5b. 
 
33 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Protected Classes, note __; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 371 (1993). 
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 For example, assume that a challenged practice produced (1) monopoly overcharges of 
$100, (2) efficiency gains of $60, (3) a deadweight loss of $50, and (4) loss of competitor 
investment of $30. The optimal deterrence model indicates damages equal to $150 (overcharge 
plus deadweight loss). This would make the practice profitable, since it produces profits of $160 
(overcharge plus efficiency gain). But the practice is in fact inefficient, because it also caused $30 
in loss of competitor investment. A properly defined deterrence model should include as damages 
the sum of overcharges, deadweight loss and loss of competitor investment caused by the 
exclusionary practice. 
 
 The optimal deterrence model suggests damages of zero for failed attempts. Suppose an 
anticompetitively intended exclusionary practice fails to create a monopoly. Perhaps the dominant 
firm underestimated ease of new entry or the strength of a rival. For example, the firm attempted 
predatory pricing but quickly found that the costs exceeded any anticipated benefits. The failed 
attempt produces no monopoly overcharge, and thus it produces no deadweight loss. Clearly, 
however, rivals could have been injured. Suppose a firm engaging in predatory pricing forces one 
rival to shut down, but four other rivals remain, and prices stay as competitive as they had been 
before. Although the attempt fails, the unrecoverable investments of the rival forced to exit are a 
social cost of this particular attempt to monopolize. The exiting competitor should be permitted a 
lawsuit in this case, but damages should be based on the lost investment.34 
 
The Optimal Deterrence Model in Litigation 
 
 The case for adopting the optimal deterrence model wholesale becomes quite weak when 
we consider the difficulties of using it in litigation. The model requires a court to account for 
several variables that are usually impossible to measure. For example, the entire discussion of 
optimal deterrence was predicated on a given probability than an antitrust violation would be 
detected. For example, the treble damages rule that we actually have is justified by an assumption 
that the risk of detection and successful prosecution is precisely one in three. 
 
 But administering such a rule requires us to know the probability of detection and 
successful prosecution ex ante. Not only do we have no reliable information about the probability 
of detection, but it is clear that different antitrust violations produce widely different probabilities 
of detection. For example, the probability of detection of a corporate merger or of a public joint 
venture is virtually 100%. The probability of detection of secret price fixing agreements is 
certainly much lower, or else there would be far fewer such agreements.35 
                                                        
34 See Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 435 (1990). 
 
35 There have been some attempts to estimate the probability of detection of cartels overall. See 
Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: the Probability of Getting Caught, 48 Rev. 
Econ. & Stat. 531 (1991), which estimates very roughly that between 13% and 17% of cartels are 
detected and successfully prosecuted. See also the discussion of the Justice Department's cartel 
amnesty program in Hoffman–La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 169, 124 S.Ct. 2359, 
2369 (2004), on remand, 388 F.3d 337 (D.C.Cir.2004). That program is designed to improve 
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 But even within the class of secret price fixing agreements known by the participants to be 
illegal, the probability of detection varies with the nature of the agreement. A cartel with a dozen 
members may be easier to detect than one with three members (unless the government scrutinizes 
three firm markets much more carefully). A cartel in a market with thousands of small buyers may 
avoid detection more easily than a cartel with a small number of large, knowledgeable buyers. A 
cartel in an industry where the costs are well known to outsiders is certainly easier to detect than 
a cartel in an industry in which costs are unknown. A cartel containing firms with widely differing 
sizes and levels of efficiency is calculated to invite defection, and the probability of detection may 
rise as the number of defections increases. A cartel that finds it necessary to incorporate certain 
facilitating devices, such as basing point pricing, that are hard to disguise from the public, is 
certainly more likely to be detected than one that can get along without such devices.36  Finally, 
the probability of detection may vary with the amount of the monopoly price increase—the higher 
the increase, the greater the likelihood of detection.37 
 
 Even assuming that through some miracle we could compute the probability of detection 
for all the various kinds of cartels and then produce some weighted "average" probability of 
detection, such as one in three, we still would not have adequate information upon which to 
assess optimal penalties. For example, if we concluded that the average probability of detection of 
all cartels was one in three, and created a treble damages rule, firms would respond by creating 
more cartels for which the probability of detection is less than one in three, and fewer cartels for 
which the probability of detection was greater than one in three. As soon as that happened, the 
weighted average and damages multiplier would have to be recomputed.38 
 
 Our usable knowledge of probability of detection is so scant that any argument that the 
damages multiplier is used to offset the probability of detection must admit that the choice of 
treble damages or any other multiplier is an absolute shot in the dark. Treble damages is probably 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
cartel detection rates by giving criminal amnesty and reduced civil penalties to cartel members 
who blow the whistle on their associates.   For interesting graphical analysis of cartel detection 
rates worldwide, see John M. Conner, Cartels & Antitrust Portrayed: Detection – Private 
International Cartels, 1990-2008 (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372866.  The authors conclude that 
detection rates are much higher than they used to be, but that many foreign jurisdictions are doing 
better than the United States is. 
 
36 See Federal Antitrust Policy, § 4.6. 
 
37 See Michael K. Block, FrederickC. Nold & J. Gregory Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 89 J.Pol.Econ. 429, 431 (1981).  See also Juwon Kwak, Optimal Antitrust 
Enforcement: Judicial Standard, Judicial Error and Deterrence Effect (Georgetown Univ. 
Working Paper, July, 2010). 
 
38 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Treble Damages Reform, 33 Antitrust Bull. 233 (1988). 
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outrageously overdeterrent with respect to some offenses, such as mergers, and underdeterrent 
with respect to some others, such as naked collusion. 
 
 Second, computing optimal damages requires information about the size of the monopoly 
overcharge and of the deadweight loss. Courts have some experience at guessing the size of the 
overcharge; measuring the size of the deadweight loss is next to impossible. Courts often estimate 
the overcharge caused by monopoly pricing, for this is the principal basis for damages in 
consumer-brought antitrust cases. The court takes the price the plaintiff actually paid for the 
product and subtracts from it the price that would have been charged for the product in a 
competitive market. 
 
 Occasionally there will be another market with a firm and cost structure similar to the 
market at issue, from which the court can draw some inferences about the competitive price. For 
example, if St. Louis shoe retailers are convicted of price fixing, the court might look at the 
Kansas City retail market for shoes in order to determine what the competitive price of shoes 
should be. If the costs in the Kansas City market are the same as in the St. Louis market, or if any 
differences can be quantified, then the court will have some fairly reliable information about the 
competitive price. But often such information is unavailable, because the cartel is nationwide and 
the structure of foreign markets is too different to invite comparison, because the product is 
custom-made, or else because there simply are no markets similar enough to support such 
comparisons. Courts generally respond to these difficulties by saying that once violation and fact 
of injury are established, the plaintiff and court need only develop an approximation of the amount 
of the overcharge.39 
 
 Calculation of the deadweight loss makes calculation of the overcharge look easy. If a 
demand curve is perfectly linear the monopoly overcharge is equal to twice the deadweight loss, 
but real world demand curves are seldom linear. As a result, the relationship between deadweight 
loss and overcharge is not constant but varies from case to case. Furthermore, it presents an 
empirical question that is certainly beyond courtroom measurement. About the only thing that can 
be said with any confidence is that when the demand curve is concave the amount of the 
monopolist's output reduction from the competitive level will be larger than it would be if the 
curve were linear. By contrast, if the demand curve is convex, then the amount of the output 
reduction from the competitive level will be smaller than it would be if the curve were linear.40 
However, deadweight loss is not a function merely of the output reduction, but also of the amount 
of consumers' surplus above the output reduction. In order to measure it, the court would have to 
determine the price that would have existed in a competitive market, reconstruct the demand 
curve faced by the monopolist, and then compute the size of the deadweight triangle. 
 
 The difficulties of applying the optimal deterrence model in litigation suggest that, at least 
                                                        
39 See the discussion infra. 
 
40 See Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition 144 (2d ed. 1969). 
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for the time being, courts should retain the system under which damages are calculated on the 
basis of the plaintiff's losses rather than the defendant's gains. First of all, whether deterrence or 
compensation is the underlying goal of private antitrust enforcement, a powerful case can be made 
that the framers of the antitrust laws intended damages as compensation. Most obviously, § 4 of 
the Clayton Act authorizes a private plaintiff to sue and "recover three-fold the damages by him 
sustained * * *."41 Indeed, damages based on compensation are a virtually universal attribute of 
private litigation in every legal area. 
 
 In addition, an economic as well as a legislative case can be made for compensatory 
measurement. The view that the purpose of private damages actions is to deter does not 
necessarily dictate that damages be based on some formula other than computation of the 
plaintiff's losses. Within a deterrence system, the amount of any potential transfer from defendants 
to plaintiffs serves both as the potential defendants' incentive to avoid the activity and as the 
potential plaintiffs' incentive to bring the action. Presumably, a plaintiff's incentive to sue is not 
strictly a function of the amount of its losses—that is, if all antitrust recoveries were regulated at 
$1,000,000 many plaintiffs would continue to sue, including some whose injuries were less than 
$1,000,000 and some whose injuries were far greater. At the time of suit the plaintiff's injuries are 
"sunk," and the potential recovery must be treated simply as a prospect of future income. 
Nevertheless, if optimal deterrence damages were so low that plaintiffs were unwilling to undergo 
the costs and risks of litigation, then optimal deterrence damages would not optimally deter: too 
few lawsuits would be filed. 
 
 Further, there is no reason to believe that compensatory measurement is worse than any 
other kind of measurement in estimating the optimal amount of damages. Any "optimal damages" 
rule applied in litigation will end up being so capricious that the resulting recoveries will have only 
a random relationship with the optimal level of deterrence. In that case, if all rules for estimating 
damages are equally good (or equally bad), then a strong case can be made that the damages 
formula should attempt to maximize social wealth in some other way. Two possibilities come to 
mind. One is to maximize social wealth by reducing the costs of litigation. For example, a rule that 
all antitrust damages recoveries will be $1,000,000 would eliminate damages "computation" 
entirely. Once standing, violation and antitrust injury had been established, the plaintiff would be 
entitled to collect its $1,000,000 and go home. 
 
 The alternative rule, which intuitively seems to increase the wealth of society far more, is 
the compensation rule. At the very least, the compensation rule attempts to quantify the private 
losses (discounted by gains) of successful plaintiffs. Further, the sum of all private losses, reduced 
by gains, is the social cost of any activity. Second, if people place any value at all on "redress" or 
"restoration," then compensatory measurement increases social wealth in a way that cannot be 
overlooked. Third, our democratic policy as expressed in § 4 of the Clayton Act commands it. 
 
                                                        
4115 U.S.C.A. § 15. On the legislative history respecting damages actions, see Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, note __ at 21–30, 41–48. 
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The Rationale for Treble Damages 
 
 Section 4 of the Clayton Act grants a prevailing plaintiff "three-fold the damages * * * 
sustained."1 Treble damages for antitrust violations were hardly new with the federal antitrust 
laws. Already in 1623 the English Statute of Monopolies provided that any person injured by a 
monopoly "shall recover three times so much as the damages that he sustained by means or 
occasion of being so hindered * * *."2 Few legal rules are more firmly rooted in history than treble 
damages recovery for victims of antitrust violations. 
 
 Although the Sherman Act and later the Clayton Act both provided for treble damages, 
the Congressional Record suggests that the members of Congress spent very little time debating 
the issue. Indeed, the members of Congress probably did not believe there would be a great deal 
of private antitrust enforcement.3 
 
 The rationales given for treble damages in private antitrust actions are manifold. Perhaps 
the oldest is that the antitrust violator deserves to be punished for his crimes, and mere payment 
of single damages is not punishment enough. This moral argument has gradually given way to an 
argument based on general deterrence: since not all antitrust violations are detected, a rule 
providing only single damages would make antitrust violations profitable.4 
 
 As the previous section suggests, there is no precise correlation between a particular 
damages rule and the amount of deterrence provided. Viewed in the most favorable light, the 
treble damages rule must be characterized as a guess that single damages provides too little 
deterrence and would permit too many antitrust violations to go unchallenged. Likewise, some 
higher multiplier, such as tenfold damages, would yield overdeterrence and flood the dockets with 
unmeritorious actions filed by people seeking a quick settlement from a risk averse defendant. 
There will never be anything approaching a perfect fit.5 
 
 One thing is clear, however. The treble damages rule has different effects in different areas 
of substantive antitrust law. Some antitrust violations, such as clandestine price fixing, are quasi-
                                                        
1 15 U.S.C.A. § 15. 
 
2  21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623). 
 
3 21 Cong. Rec. 2569 (1890). Senator Sherman originally proposed double damages. After a few 
amendments, the final proposal for treble damages was modeled largely after the English Statute 
on Monopolies. Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy 212 (1955); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1989). 
 
4 See the discussion, supra. 
 
5 For a more general discussion, see Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really 
Single Damages?, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 115 (1993). 
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criminal or even criminal in character. A large amount of deterrence and perhaps even moral 
outrage expressed by punitive damages is appropriate. Other antitrust violations such as mergers 
generally take place only after the parties have made some kind of calculation that the act is legal. 
The line between efficiency-creating and efficiency-destroying practices is difficult to locate, and 
overdeterrence comes with much higher social costs. Furthermore, the case for "punishment" is 
far weaker. 
 
 Congress has entertained proposals that would limit the scope of treble damages recovery 
in antitrust litigation. For example, one proposal would have provided for treble damages in cases 
involving per se antitrust violations, but single damages for rule of reason violations.6  A second 
proposal would have permitted single damages for lost profits, but treble damages for monopoly 
overcharges.7 Neither proposal passed. 
 
 Although segregating antitrust violations for different damages multipliers is a good idea 
and might reduce excessive litigation in certain substantive areas, the distinction between per se 
and rule of reason violations is not the appropriate place to draw the line. Nor is the distinction 
between overcharge and lost profit damages. The most plausible rationale for multiple damages is 
that they provide a proper deterrent in situations where the chances that the defendant will be 
caught are relatively small. In that case, however, use of the same multiplier would be 
overdeterrent in situations where the chances of detection are very high. 
 
 The best place to draw the line between different damage multipliers is between 
"clandestine" or secret violations on one side, and "public" violations on the other. Price fixing, 
predatory pricing, improper patent infringement suits and some other exclusionary practices 
would generally fit into the former category in which the secrecy of the violation requires a 
damages multiplier. However, mergers and joint ventures of public record, refusals to deal, resale 
price maintenance and other vertical restraints would fit into the latter category, in which single 
damages would be more appropriate. Most mergers are reported in the press or on the internet 
when they occur. In such cases the inference is strong that the parties undertaking the action did 
                                                        
6 See the draft of Reagan Administration Legislation on Antitrust, Patents, and Joint Research and 
Development Ventures, 44 Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report (BNA) 1272 (June 30, 1983), 
which would abolish treble damages and grant only single damages except with respect to 
"agreements or practices the nature or necessary effect of which is so plainly anticompetitive that 
they are deemed unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate study in each individual case 
as to the precise harm they have caused or the business justification for their use * * *." 
 
 
7 Antitrust Remedies Improvements Act of 1986, Trade Reg. Rptr. (CCH), Report 744 at 21–22 
(Feb. 24, 1986). Both proposals are discussed in Herbert Hovenkamp, Treble Damages Reform, 
33 Antitrust Bull. 233 (1988). For a survey of alternatives, see Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling 
Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 Tul.L.Rev. 777 (1987). 
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not believe they were violating the antitrust laws. Further, the probability of detection is 100%.8 
 
 Most vertical restraints must also be characterized as more public than clandestine. 
Although the "offense" in such cases is not always obvious to the public, the victim (and most 
frequently the subsequent plaintiff) is usually a party to the agreement in which the offense was 
contained. For example, the general public may not have very good knowledge about the "tying 
arrangement" under which a franchisor requires its franchisees to lease their locations from the 
franchisor as a condition of obtaining the franchise. However, the plaintiff in such cases is usually 
the franchisee, not consumers, and the franchisee is a party to the agreement containing the tying 
arrangement.9   Detection of violators in such situations is not a problem, assuming that the 
franchisee is the person who bears the cost of the violation. 
 
 The second problem with dividing treble and single damages actions between per se and 
rule of reason antitrust violations is the complex problem of "characterization" that accompanies a 
judicial decision whether to apply the rule of reason. For example, although explicit, clandestine 
price fixing is per se illegal, not all agreements among competitors that affect price are illegal per 
se, and it often takes the Supreme Court to tell us which rule should be applied. Likewise, today 
both the rule of reason and the per se rule are applied to tying arrangements, vertical restraints 
cases, and concerted refusals to deal, depending on the circumstances. Whether a particular act 
was undertaken in public or in secret with the intent to withhold information from the public, 
however, is a question of fact. 
 
 Finally, a policy of providing treble damages for clandestine activities concealed from the 
public, and single damages for public activities, would give firms an incentive to "go public" with 
activities that may be efficient but whose legality is open to some doubt. Exchanges of price 
information, long-term contractual arrangements, and joint ventures are less likely to be 
anticompetitive if the public (and the government enforcement agencies) know about them from 
their inception and are thus able to keep a watchful eye. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8 See the proposal in Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, 
Epilogue, 305-306 (2005). 
 
9 E.g., Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 
1059, 118 S.Ct. 1385 (1998). 
 
How Accurately Must Damages Be Measured? 
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 Any discussion of the accuracy required in measurement of antitrust damages must begin 
with one premise: the use of private damages actions to enforce the antitrust laws will be 
undermined by an unrealistic requirement of precision. When a potential plaintiff calculates the 
chances that antitrust litigation will be successful, he takes into account the risk that he will not be 
able to prove damages, or that he will not be able to prove an adequate amount of damages. If the 
probability that he can successfully make out standing, the substantive violation, and antitrust 
injury is high, but his estimate of damages will likely be thrown out of court, then the action may 
not be promising.1  Any system of antitrust enforcement that takes private damages actions 
seriously must permit plaintiffs to estimate damages by mechanisms that are reasonably within 
their reach. 
 
 Computation of damages often involves more speculation than determining that a 
particular act is anticompetitive and should be condemned. For example, proof that a price fixing 
conspiracy existed and even that it raised the price of some product may be relatively easy to 
establish, but quantifying the increase can be very difficult. In this case, the overcharge is the 
difference between the price that would have prevailed in a competitive market and the price 
actually charged by the cartel. In the competitive market, firms presumably would have sold at 
marginal cost; however, marginal cost would normally be somewhat higher in the competitive 
market than it was in the cartelized market.2  The result is that precise quantification of the cartel 
overcharge requires not merely knowledge of the defendants' marginal costs—a fact normally out 
of reach of most courts—but knowledge of what their marginal cost would have been at 
competitive rates of output. Any legal rule that required the plaintiff to establish this figure with 
even modest precision would effectively be a rule of nonrecovery. 
 
 The Supreme Court has responded to these difficulties by setting a relatively high standard 
for proof of the fact of an antitrust violation and resulting injury, but a lower standard for proof of 
the amount of damages. As the Supreme Court put it in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson 
Parchment Paper Co., "there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to 
                                                        
1 Many plaintiffs who did or perhaps could have established a violation have been frustrated by 
their inability to show damages with sufficient precision. See, e.g., Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 152 F.3d 588 (7th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1071, 119 S.Ct. 804 (1999) (plaintiff could not prove damages, but was entitled to an injunction); 
United States Football League v. NFL, 644 F.Supp. 1040, 1051–1054 (S.D.N.Y.1986), affirmed, 
842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir.1988) (jury could not find actual damages without undue speculation 
about which losses were caused by defendant's violation and which were caused by its own 
business decisions and fortunes; nominal damages approved). A particularly good discussion of 
the kind and degree of permissible speculation or uncertainty is Roger D. Blair & William H. 
Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 423 (1995), developed further in 2A 
Antitrust Law ¶¶ 391-392 (3d ed. 2007). 
 
2 That is to say, in the relevant decision making range marginal cost is typically rising, and would 
thus be higher at the competitive output than the cartel output. 
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establish the fact that petitioner has sustained some damage and the measure of proof necessary to 
enable the jury to fix the amount."3 
 
 The need for relaxed standards of measurement is augmented by the fact that the 
uncertainty is often caused by the defendant's control of essential information. In price fixing 
cases, for example, the relevant cost data that will establish the relationship between the 
defendant's costs and the cartel price are not only exclusively in the control of the defendants, but 
thoughtful firms engaged in price fixing may have distorted or destroyed these data. Once again, 
the Supreme Court has responded that the "risk of the uncertainty" in damages measurement 
which was created by the defendant's own wrongdoing must ultimately fall on the defendant 
itself.4 
 
 This proposition can be carried to extremes, however: the defendant's unlawful acts are 
presumably responsible for the difference between the plaintiff's actual position and its position 
had the violation not occurred. Measurement of that difference is certain to require some 
speculation, even if the defendant produces all relevant evidence. A rule that saddled the 
defendant with the entire risk of uncertainty of measurement would open the door to unlimited 
speculation by plaintiffs. At the very least, a defendant who cannot rebut a plaintiff's damages 
claims with facts must be permitted to challenge their plausibility. 
 
 Courts have not gone so far as to throw the entire burden of uncertainty upon the 
defendant. Rather they have required the plaintiff to establish at least a reasonable basis for belief 
that its damages equal some particular amount. Then the defendant may give evidence that 
various elements of the plaintiff's claim should be reduced or eliminated. As the Supreme Court 
assessed the plaintiff's requirement, "while the damages may not be determined by mere 
speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter 
of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate."5  This effectively forces 
the plaintiff and defendant to share the risk of uncertainty. In extreme cases—where it is clear at 
                                                        
3 282 U.S. 555, 562, 51 S.Ct. 248, 250 (1931). Accord Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. 
Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 200 (1st Cir.), appeal after remand, 175 F.3d 18 (1st 
Cir.1999). 
 
4 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379, 47 S.Ct. 400, 405 
(1927): 
 
* * * a defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise 
damages suffered by the plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with 
the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible. 
 
See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265, 66 S.Ct. 574, 580 (1946). 
 
5 Story Parchment, __ 3, 282 U.S. at 563, 51 S.Ct. at 250. 
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an early stage that any proof of damage will be highly speculative—the court may dismiss the 
complaint. The Supreme Court has cited the speculative nature of damage claims as one basis for 
denying antitrust standing.6 
 
 The general trend in the lower courts, where most of the antitrust law of damages is made, 
has been to impose rather strict standards for proof of violation and fact of injury, but to allow 
greater latitude for estimates of the amount.7  One result is that well-prepared plaintiffs come into 
court with economic experts armed with computer-created models that often rest on many 
debatable but plausible assumptions. If the plaintiff had stayed in business but for the antitrust 
violation, and if its share of the market had persisted, if the overall market continued to grow at 
its pre-violation rate, and if the rate of return were not changed substantially by new entry, then 
the plaintiff would have made this amount of profits. The problem with such models is that any 
particular assumption, taken alone, may be plausible. However, the models frequently compound 
one "plausible" assumption upon another with the result that the final outcome must be 
characterized more as "possible" than plausible.8  Then the line between plausibility and 
speculation becomes rather difficult to locate. Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in the case 
of damages actions by precluded firms—plaintiffs who allege that they were prevented by the 
defendant's violation from ever entering business in the first place. 
 
                                                        
6 Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 543–
544, 103 S.Ct. 897, 911–912 (1983).  
 
7 A typical example is this conclusion from the Third Circuit's decision in LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 
324 F.3d 141, 166 (3d Cir.2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953, 124 S.Ct. 2932 (2004), 
an exclusionary practices case: 
 
In Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 812 (3d Cir.1984), this court 
stated that "[i]n constructing a hypothetical world free of the defendants' exclusionary activities, 
the plaintiffs are given some latitude in calculating damages, so long as their theory is not wholly 
speculative." Id. Once a jury has found that the unlawful activity caused the antitrust injury, the 
damages may be determined without strict proof of what act caused the injury, as long as the 
damages are not based on speculation or guesswork. Id. at 813. The Bonjorno court noted that it 
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to segregate and attribute a fixed amount of 
damages to any one act as the theory was not that any one act in itself was unlawful, but that all 
the acts taken together showed a § 2 violation. Id. 
 
8 For some of the problems produced by strings of plausible assumptions see Litton Systems, Inc. 
v. AT & T, 700 F.2d 785, 822–24 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073, 104 S.Ct. 984 
(1984); Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Col., 642 F.2d 845, 858 (5th Cir.1981), rehearing denied, 651 
F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 975 (1981). An event whose chance 
of occurrence is 50–50 is undoubtedly "plausible." However, the chance that five such events will 
all fall in the plaintiff's favor is approximately 3%. 
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Measuring Damages for Overcharge Injuries Introduction 
 
Basic Conceptual Problems 
 
An "overcharge" injury is the injury suffered by a customer who paid a monopoly price for a 
product purchased from an illegal monopolist or cartel. The term "overcharge injury" may also 
describe the injury suffered by a seller for whom the price was suppressed by a monopsonist or 
buyer's cartel,9 or the injury suffered by the purchaser of an illegally tied product.10 
 
 The basic common law rule of compensatory damages is that a plaintiff is entitled to an 
award of damages that will restore him to the position in which he would have been but for the 
violation. Antitrust generally follows this rule, with the important difference that once the 
damages are computed, they are trebled. According to the classic formulation for antitrust 
damages, the plaintiff is entitled to treble the difference between the price he actually paid or 
received and the price that would have prevailed in a competitive market.11 
 
 The difference between the price actually paid and the competitive price is not necessarily 
the correct amount to restore the purchaser to the position in which it would have been absent the 
violation. When the price is raised to monopoly levels the purchaser will often take actions, such 
as substituting a different product for part of the monopoly product, that will reduce its total 
damages. As a result, at least in those situations where the victim is itself a business, lost profits 
rather than the monopoly overcharge might be a more correct measure of damages.12  In fact, it 
has been suggested that the Supreme Court adopted the "overcharge" method of computing 
damages in Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. Atlanta only because the plaintiff was unable 
to show lost profits.13 The plaintiff was a municipal waterworks that paid a monopoly price for 
                                                        
9 For example, see American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc., 195 F.2d 622 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957, 72 S.Ct. 1052 (1952); In re Beef Industry Antitrust 
Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905, 101 S.Ct. 280 (1980). 
 
10 See generally Ch. 10. 
 
11 See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396, 27 S.Ct. 65, 66 (1906): 
" * * * the difference between the price paid and the market or fair price * * *;" see also Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 340, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, on remand, 602 F.2d 179 (8th 
Cir.1979). 
 
12 However, in 1979, in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., Id., the Supreme Court recognized that 
consumers may have damages actions for violations of the antitrust laws. The lost profits measure 
of damages would be inappropriate for them. 
 
13 Note __; and see Lawrence A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 788 (1977); Jeffrey 
L. Harrison, The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price Enhancement Cases, 64 Minn.L.Rev. 
751, 760 (1980). 
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underground pipe. There were no measurable lost profits because the utility passed all its costs on 
to Atlanta's residents in the form of higher water rates.14  Not being able to show lost profits—at 
that time considered the ordinary measure of damages in all antitrust cases—the plaintiff sought 
recovery of the overcharge instead. 
 
 Today the overcharge method of computing damages is well established. Although both 
measures of damage are difficult to compute, overcharges remain easier to calculate in most cases 
than are lost profits, and the amount of speculation is usually less. The case has been made for a 
return to the lost profits method of damages computation in overcharge actions, particularly when 
the injured buyers include both direct and indirect purchasers.15  But courts have declined the 
invitation, and the Supreme Court's adoption of the indirect purchaser rule in Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois  makes such a rule unlikely.16 
 
 The concept of overcharge is not self-defining, however. The total amount of monopoly 
profits in a sale is the difference between the actual price and the seller's marginal cost. The 
overcharge "caused" by a particular antitrust violation could be considerably less if the market 
was not performing competitively before the violation occurred. For example, markets conducive 
to cartelization are likely candidates for oligopoly price leadership or tacit collusion.17  As a result, 
the pre-cartel price may not have been a competitive price at all but a monopoly price. At the 
extreme, a newly formed cartel might decide not to increase its price at all from the pre-cartel, 
oligopoly level, but merely to organize the market better so that sales will be assigned to the 
lowest-cost provider. In that case the "overcharge"—as measured by the difference between the 
pre-cartel and cartel prices—would be zero. However, the "overcharge" as measured by the 
difference between the cartel price and the competitive price might be quite substantial. 
 
 The same situation applies to single-firm monopolists. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., the plaintiff claimed damages both as competitor and as direct purchaser from the 
                                                        
14 Actually, to say there were no lost profits is not quite correct. Presumably the Atlanta 
waterworks sold less water when it raised its rates. Thus it might have suffered lost profits even 
though its rate of return on sales remained constant. However, many utilities face very low 
elasticities of demand, and the amount of sales lost may have been very small. Furthermore, the 
monopoly overcharge in the Atlanta waterworks case was in a durable item—steel pipe—whose 
costs would be calculated into the utility's rate base. Most price-regulated utilities receive a rate 
designed to give them their operating expenses plus a "fair rate of return" on the capital invested 
in fixed-cost materials. In that case an overcharge in a fixed-cost item could actually increase the 
utility's gross profitability, although its rate of return would remain the same. 
 
15 See Harrison, note ___; and George Kosicki & Miles B. Cahill, Economics of Cost Pass 
Through in Indirect Purchases Antitrust Cases, 51 Antitrust Bull. 599 (2006). 
 
16 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061 (1977). 
 
17 See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, § 4.2. 
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defendant.18  With respect to the latter, the Second Circuit observed that the defendant Eastman 
Kodak had already been a monopolist before it engaged in the exclusionary practices alleged to be 
illegal. A monopolist whose position is lawfully created is generally entitled to charge a monopoly 
price. 19  As a result, damages should not equal the entire difference between the monopoly price 
and a competitive price, but rather "the price increment caused by the anticompetitive conduct 
that originated or augmented the monopolist's control over the market." 
 
 This constraint may overlook the fact that not all illegal, anticompetitive conduct raises the 
monopolist's profit-maximizing price. Many of the exclusionary practices undertaken by the 
monopolist must be characterized as "mobility barriers"—that is, they are designed not to enable 
the monopolist to charge a higher price but to prevent its monopoly position from eroding.20  The 
cost of monopoly is a function both of the amount of the overcharge and inefficient substitutions, 
and of the duration of the monopoly. Some exclusionary practices such as sabotage, vexatious 
litigation, or patent fraud may have little effect on the monopolist's short-run profit-maximizing 
price but may greatly increase the duration of the monopoly by enabling the monopolist to deter 
competitive entry. In such cases, however, the proper measurement of damages under the rule in 
Berkey Photo is zero. One example of such conduct is predatory entry deterrence by the 
monopolist. Suppose that Firm A is a monopolist which for some time has charged a monopoly 
price of $1.00 for widgets. When Firm B, an aspiring entrant, appears on the scene, Firm A drops 
its price below short-run marginal cost until Firm B is driven from the market. Then it restores the 
price to the pre-entry level. In such a case, the proper measure of damages in an action brought by 
a customer is the difference between the price that the customer is forced to pay and the price that 
the customer would have paid in a market in which Firm B would have been permitted to enter. It 
is manifestly not the difference between the price Firm A was charging as a legal monopolist and 
the price that it charged after the predation had done its work. 
 
 It may also be difficult for an expert to estimate the damages caused by the particular 
"anticompetitive conduct that originated or augmented the monopolist's control over the 
market."21  We can at least conceptualize the difference between a marginal cost price and a price 
                                                        
18 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093, 100 S.Ct. 1061 (1980). Quotation at 
p. 297. Accord City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1371–1372 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct. 305 (1992); Allegheny Pepsi–Cola Bottling Co. v. 
Mid–Atlantic Coca–Cola Bottling Co., 690 F.2d 411, 415 (4th Cir.1982). 
 
19 See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law § 6.1 (4th ed. 2011) 
(forthcoming). 
 
20 See generally ch. 7; Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 Amer.Econ.Rev. 335 
(1979). 
 
21 The Second Circuit's proposal in Berkey Photo itself suggests the complexity of damages 
determination that would follow: 
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dictated by the intersection of the monopolist's marginal cost and marginal revenue curves. 
However, assuming that a monopolist was alleged to have committed two or three different 
exclusionary practices—perhaps predatory pricing, vexatious litigation, and patent fraud—it may 
be impossible to determine how to assign part of the monopolist's price increase to the patent 
fraud, part to the vexatious litigation, etc. But this division would be essential to damages 
recovery if one alleged practice were found to be illegal while the others were not. 
 
 The great majority of consumer actions for overcharge damages allege price fixing, not 
illegal monopolization. Cartel members, unlike monopolists, enjoy no presumption that they 
already had market power before the illegal act was committed. As a result, the damages rule for 
price fixing cases is somewhat clearer: the plaintiff is entitled to the difference between the 
"competitive" price and the cartel price, multiplied by the number of units purchased, multiplied 
by three. 
 
Methods of Measurement: "Yardstick" and "Before–and–After" 
 
 Assuming that the cartel price less marginal cost in a competitive market is the correct 
determinant of overcharge damages, courts would be unable to quantify damages very precisely. 
They usually cannot measure marginal cost directly. But courts have developed two surrogates 
for the competitive price. Under the "yardstick" approach the price that prevails in a different 
market, similar to the cartelized market but presumed to be competitive, becomes the surrogate 
for the competitive price. Under the "before-and-after" method the price that prevailed in the 
cartelized market before the cartel came into existence or after it fell apart is presumed to be the 
competitive price. These two approaches have been used by courts not only to estimate 
overcharges but also to estimate lost profits in competitor antitrust suits. 
 
 The courts are currently divided on the question whether the "yardstick" and "before-and-
                                                                                                                                                                                  
The wrongful conduct rule indicates that a purchaser can recover for an overcharge paid to a 
violator of § 2 only to the extent that the price he paid exceeds that which would have been 
charged in the absence of anticompetitive action. An intermediate step in the analysis may be an 
attempt to estimate what the monopolist's market share would likely have been but for the 
illegitimate conduct; it would then be possible to gauge approximately what price the defendant 
would have been able to charge with that degree of market control. 
 
603 F.2d at 298. See also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 88 
S.Ct. 2224, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 901, 89 S.Ct. 64 (1968), holding that a monopolist in shoe 
machinery violated the Sherman Act by refusing to sell its machines, but offering them only under 
lease. The plaintiff was awarded the "excess of leasing costs over what it would have cost to own 
the same machines had they been available for purchase." Presumably, however, the defendant's 
profit-maximizing price was the same regardless of whether it sold the machines or leased them. 
In that case Hanover's damages would be zero. 
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after" methodologies are the only way that plaintiffs can prove antitrust damages.  The question 
involves mainly exclusionary practices. 
 
 Yardstick Method 
 
 The yardstick method of estimating damages was approved by the Supreme Court in 
1946, in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.22  Under the yardstick method the plaintiff identifies 
some geographic market that is as similar as possible to the cartelized market, but for the 
conspiracy. Obviously, the yardstick method has certain inherent limitations. If the conspiracy is 
worldwide, there will be no other terrestrial geographic market with which the cartelized market 
can be compared. Even if the conspiracy is nationwide, the problems of comparison are 
substantial. Different countries tax and subsidize businesses in different ways and, as a result, 
firms in different countries can face very different costs. Experts might also select a different 
product market rather than a different geographic market as a "yardstick." However, that 
methodology generally works only in exclusionary practice cases. 
 
 The ideal conspiracy for the yardstick approach is a local cartel where a nearby market can 
be found which has the same basic cost structure. Adjustments must probably be made for 
differences in taxes and regulatory fees, costs of transportation, and different wage and salary 
rates. However, if these differences can be isolated and quantified, an expert economist or 
accountant should be able to produce a "reconstructed" price that would have prevailed in the 
cartelized market if it had the same level of competition as exists in the yardstick market. 
 
 A good illustration of the method in practice is Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage 
Ass'n, which involved a price fixing conspiracy among liquor retailers in Lubbock County, 
Texas.23 In estimating damages the plaintiff's expert compared prices in Lubbock County during 
                                                        
22 327 U.S. 251, 66 S.Ct. 574, rehearing denied, 327 U.S. 817, 66 S.Ct. 815 (1946). Bigelow 
applied the yardstick method not to estimation of monopoly overcharge, but to estimation of lost 
profits. 
 
23 721 F.2d 1019, 1026 (5th Cir.1983), rehearing denied, 726 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.1984). See also 
National Farmers' Org. v. Associated Milk Producers, 850 F.2d 1286, 1294–1298 (8th Cir.1988), 
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081, 109 S.Ct. 1535 (1989) (permitting different geographic area to be 
used as a yardstick, in spite of numerous differences, but no alternative method seemed any 
better); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler–Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1044 (4th 
Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1753 (1988) (requiring "reasonable 
comparability" between plaintiff's market and yardstick market); Home Placement Serv. v. 
Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 1205–1206 (1st Cir.1987) (same). See also Piggly 
Wiggly Clarksville, Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 100 Fed.Appx. 296, 2004 WL 1245275 (5th 
Cir.2004) (faulting expert's yardstick damages model for including variables such as "negotiating 
ability" that were too difficult to quantify: "We question whether these factors can be included in a 
general formula, since a variable cannot be included in a regression formula unless a numerical 
value can be assigned to it."). 
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the conspiracy period with those that prevailed in Dallas, which was presumably competitive. 
First, the expert developed a ratio that reflected cost differentials between the two markets, and 
from this ratio calculated what were described as "should have been" prices for the defendants' 
products during the conspiracy years. From these prices the expert was then able to estimate that 
the cartel overcharged purchasers by about 7.74%. This percentage of the defendants' total sales 
during the conspiracy period equaled the aggregate monopoly overcharge.24 
 
Before–and–After Method 
 
 While the "before-and-after" method of estimating damages has a longer pedigree than the 
yardstick method,25  it can involve even more speculation.26  Under the before-and-after method, 
the plaintiff produces evidence about the market price before the alleged cartel was formed or 
after it ceased to exist, or both. From these data the fact finder is then asked to reconstruct a 
competitive price during the conspiracy period. Damages are the difference between this 
reconstructed price and the actual price charged by the cartel. 
 
 If the market in which the cartel occurred is concentrated and conducive to price 
leadership or tacit collusion, a good deal of monopoly overcharge may be built into the pre-cartel 
price to begin with. As a result, the before-and-after method may not really measure the difference 
between the cartel price and a truly "competitive" price at all. More importantly, markets change 
greatly through time, and the before-and-after model must be adjusted to account for these 
changes. This problem cannot be solved by the simple device of discounting all dollars to the same 
value to account for inflation or the Consumer Price Index. The price of some products will rise 
by much more than the index, while the price of other products will rise by much less. If a 
substantial change in supply conditions or consumer preference causes a shift in the supply curve 
or demand curve of the cartelized product, the before-and-after method may substantially 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
24 For further development, including detailed examples, see 2A Antitrust Law ¶¶ 395b1  397e (3d 
ed. 2007). 
 
25 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 378–79, 47 S.Ct. 400, 
405 (1927); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561, 51 S.Ct. 
248, 250 (1931). Like the yardstick method, the before-and-after method was developed to 
estimate lost profits rather than overcharge injuries. However, today it is used to estimate both. 
See Home Placement, note __ at 1205 & n. 7 (discussing both methods; finding before-and-after 
method inadequate for plaintiff who was driven out of business before it was able to compile a 
record of profits). 
 
26 For a criticism of the before and after method, see Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 
1158, 1165 (7th Cir.1987), finding that simple before and after comparison is inadequate, at least 
when "other causal factors are at work." See also In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litigation, 
893 F.Supp. 1497 (D.Kan.1995) (criticizing and refusing to admit expert's "before-and-after" 
damage model for methodological failures). 
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overstate or understate the true measure of damages. 
 
 For example, using the before-and-after method to estimate the impact of a uranium cartel 
would exaggerate the monopoly overcharge if the estimator failed to consider that during the 
same period a cartel in crude oil also came into existence. The price increase for oil would have 
pushed the price for uranium up even absent the uranium cartel. In this case, the creation of the oil 
cartel effectively shifted the demand curve for the uranium to the right. If the before-and-after 
method is to be accurate, it must take the shift into account.27 
 
 If changes in the demand for uranium unrelated to the existence of the cartel are random, 
however, they will tend to cancel each other out, provided that we look at a long enough time 
period. If it is possible to have evidence of the market price both before the cartel came into 
existence and after it broke up, then the measurement is likely to be more accurate. Nevertheless, 
even the most optimistic assessment of the before-and-after method of estimating damages must 
conclude that it yields only rough approximations of the price that would have prevailed had the 
conspiracy not occurred. 
 
 Both the yardstick and before-and-after methods of measuring overcharge damages can be 
facilitated by econometric techniques such as regression analysis. The example that follows, which 
uses a single linear regression in order to estimate damages, is far simpler than any likely to be 
encountered in litigation. It is presented in order to illustrate the technique. If a regression model 
is to be used to estimate damages in litigation, an expert should be employed to create the model, 
estimate the damages, and usually to defend the model in court. The other side may offer its own 
expert to testify against the proposed model or offer an alternative model more favorable to its 
position.28 
 
 Suppose that macaroni manufacturers are accused of fixing the content of macaroni by 
agreement at 50% semolina and 50% farina. They do this in order to reduce their demand for 
                                                        
27 The illustration is taken from In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.1980). 
See also Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1148, 123 S.Ct. 876 (2003), an exclusionary practice case which approved a before-
and-after methodology even though the market contained two new firms that accounted for a 
significant portion of the defendant's slower market share growth. Contrast Craftsmen Limousine, 
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 363 F.3d 761 (8th Cir.2004), which correctly rejected an expert's study 
that ignored the entry of two additional firms which would have affected the parties' growth rates. 
 
28 Regression models are also used to estimate lost profits as a result of illegal exclusionary 
practices. See Richard C. Hoyt, Dale C. Dahl & Stuart D. Gibson, Comprehensive Models for 
Assessing Lost Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 Minn.L.Rev. 1233 (1976). For more technical 
discussions of such models, see 2A Antitrust Law ¶ ¶ 394-397, 399 (3d ed. 2007); Federal 
Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 137 (Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial 
Center, 2d ed. 2000).  The Third Edition of the Reference Manual will be published in 2011. 
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durum wheat, from which semolina is made, and thus to depress its price.29 They are sued for 
treble damages by growers and sellers of durum wheat. It has been established that the conspiracy 
existed and was effective during the harvest and buying seasons of 1994, 1995, and 1996. Now 
the difference between the depressed price and the competitive price must be estimated for those 
years. Data about production and price have been produced for a ten year period, 1990–1999. All 
prices have been adjusted to constant dollars. 
 
 The evidence shows that during the ten years in question the market price of durum wheat 
was as follows: 
 
 
      1990:     $4.50/     bushel       
 
      1991:     $5.00                 
 
      1992:     $4.00                 
 
      1993:     $3.00                 
 
      1994:     $4.00               (conspiracy year) 
 
      1995:     $3.00               (conspiracy year) 
 
      1996:     $5.00               (conspiracy year) 
 
      1997:     $5.00                 
 
      1998:     $3.00                 
 
      1999:     $3.50                 
 
 
 It is certainly not apparent from these price data how much the conspiracy depressed the 
price of durum wheat. Although the price of durum may have been lower than average during the 
conspiracy years, it was not outrageously low, and it was equally low during some nonconspiracy 
years. Furthermore, in 1996, which was a conspiracy year, the price was substantially higher than 
it was in several of the nonconspiracy years. 
                                                        
29 See National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n, 65 F.T.C. 583 (1964), affirmed, 345 F.2d 421 (7th 
Cir.1965). See also Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling–Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 
1224, 1238 (3d Cir.1993) (approving similar technique). Cf. In re Plastic Cutlery Antitrust 
Litigation, 1998–1 Trade Cases ¶ 72,107 (CCH), 1998 WL 135703 (E.D.Pa.1998) (describing 
multiple regression technique for estimating damages in price-fixing case). 
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 The average price of durum over the ten years was $4.00. Plotting the price of durum for 
the ten years on the graph in Figure 5 reveals the inconclusiveness of the price data. 
 
 However, the record reveals that the defendants agreed to depress the price of durum 
during the three conspiracy years because harvests were very bad and the output of durum was 
much lower than usual. During the ten years in question the harvests of durum were as follows: 
 
1990:     4.7     million    bu.       
 
1991:     3.7                 
 
1992:     4.8                 
 
1993:     7.1                 
 
1994:     2.9               (conspiracy year) 
 
1995:     4.6               (conspiracy year) 
 
1996:     2.6               (conspiracy year) 
 
1997:     4.2                 
 
1998:     6.5                 
 
1999:     6.1                 
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 The price of durum, like the price of everything else, is a function of the available supply. 
To be sure, other things, such as consumer tastes or federal regulation and taxation, also affect 
the price of durum. Likewise, the price of durum will be affected by the price of other products. 
For example, if the price of a complementary product such as olive oil increases sharply, then the 
price of durum may decrease. Generally, people who use macaroni products also use olive oil in 
some constant proportion. A disastrous olive crop might reduce the available supply of olive oil, 
causing a sharp increase in the olive oil price. If durum is plentiful, however, the chief result of the 
olive oil shortage will be to reduce demand for durum, and its price will fall. Conversely, if the 
price of a substitute product rises sharply, then the demand for durum will increase and its price 
will rise. For example, if durum and farina were substitutes in the manufacturing of macaroni, 
people would respond to a shortage of farina by switching to durum, and the demand for durum 
would increase. 
 
 But let us suppose that these other factors are not notably present. Although consumer 
taste and the available supply of complementary and substitute products may have had some effect 
on the price of durum, these effects were both small and were probably unsystematic. If they were 
truly random, their effects would tend to cancel each other out. So we can say with some 
confidence that the price of durum during the period 1990–1999 varied inversely with the amount 
of durum produced in any given year. 
 
 Figure 6 shows the relationship between the price and supply of durum during the seven 
nonconspiracy years. Only the nonconspiracy years are plotted, because we want to establish a 
price function for the nonconspiracy years and then measure how much the price deviated from 
that function during the conspiracy years. 
 
 
 
 Figure 6 suggests that the size of the harvest and the market price in the nonconspiracy 
years varied inversely and that the relationship between them may be close to linear—that is, that 
price rose roughly proportionately to decrease in harvest size. If we could draw a constant curve 
that accurately described the relationship between price and harvest size in Figure 6, we might 
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have a basis from which to estimate damages during the nonconspiracy years. 
 
 The method most generally used to construct such a curve in simple linear regression 
analysis is identification of a straight line of least squares—that is, a straight line such that the sum 
of the squares of each datum's deviation from the line is as small as possible. The equation that 
represents the data in Figure 6, assuming it is a straight line, is: 
 
Y = a + bX + E, 
 
in which X and Y are the variables, a and b are constants that will determine the slope of the line, 
and E is the error, or "disturbance," which reflects the amount that each datum on the graph 
deviates from the line when it is drawn. When the line is properly drawn the sum of the squares of 
the individual disturbances will be the smallest possible number; furthermore, the amount of error 
caused by datum entries that are below the line will precisely cancel out the amount of error 
caused by entries that are above the line; so the net error will be zero. 
 
 Importantly, a regression does not prove that deviations from the determined function are 
random. In this case, linear regression will enable us to draw a line that represents a function 
determined by a given set of data, assuming that all deviations from the function are both 
relatively small and random. When the function is drawn, the upward and downward deviations 
will cancel each other out; however, this is because we assumed randomness, and not because the 
line establishes randomness. 
 
 Many of the problems that arise in damages litigation using regression models concern the 
assumption that a particular disturbance is random. For example, in the earlier illustration about 
the OPEC cartel's being created during the existence of a uranium cartel, the OPEC cartel would 
almost certainly have to be treated as a significant nonrandom disturbance: its effect could have 
been to raise the noncartel price of uranium substantially. In that case the effect of the OPEC 
cartel on the market for uranium must be computed separately. 
 
 If we cannot identify any substantial, nonrandom factors other than supply that might 
influence the price of durum, our price function will have a slope to conform to the data entered in 
the graph in Figure 6, such that the sum of the squares of the disturbances, Σ(E2) is, as small as 
possible. The formula for such a line consists of the following pair of equations: 
 
 (I) Σ(Y) = Na + bΣ(X) 
 
 (II) Σ(XY) = aΣ(X) + bΣ(X 2), 
 
in which N equals the number of data in the sample.30 
                                                        
30 There is nothing particularly magic about drawing a function that minimizes the sum of the 
squares of the distances from the plotted data. One could as easily use absolute values, the 
absolute value of the cubes of the data, or the data raised to the fourth power. Statisticians used 
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 In Figure 6 (on the preceding page) the price information was plotted on the X axis and 
harvest information was plotted on the Y axis; so X = price, and Y = quantity. From the price and 
harvest information presented above, we can determine the following: 
 
 
 
 
Substituting these values into the pair of equations above gives us: 
 
(I) 37.1 = 7a + 28b 
 
(II) 142 = 28a + 116.5b 
 
 Multiplying (I) by 4 gives: 
 
(I) 148.4 = 28a + 112b 
 
and subtracting (II) from (I) yields: 
 
6.4 = 4.5b; 
 
or b = 1.42 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
least squares largely as a matter of convention. 
 
The pair of equations given in the text for producing the line of least squares is derived rather 
easily. See Wolfram MathWorld Web Mathematics Resource, available at 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/LeastSquaresFitting.html (revised Aug. 30, 2010).  Print sources 
include  Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony, chs. 4-6 (David 
L. Faigman, et al, eds., 2009-2010 ed.). 
 
Hovenkamp Antitrust Damages    February, 2011, Page 39 
 
 
and substituting this into (I) yields a = 10.98. 
 
 This means that the function is 
 
Y = 10.98 1.42X 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 7 gives the resulting demand curve (D), superimposed over the same data that 
appeared in Figure 6. Now we can enter the data from the three conspiracy years and measure the 
amount that the actual price in those years deviated from the "reconstructed" price exhibited on 
the regression function. Points A, B and C on Figure 7 show the price-harvest size coordinates for 
the three conspiracy years. Point A reveals that during the first year of the conspiracy the price of 
durum was depressed about $1.70 per bushel from the competitive price. Point B reveals that 
during the second year the price was depressed about $1.50. Point C shows that during the third 
conspiracy year price was depressed about 85 Damages for each of those years should equal the 
amount each plaintiff sold multiplied by the deviation from the reconstructed "competitive price" 
curve. This amount, of course, must then be trebled. 
 
Damages for Exclusionary Practices 
 
When Are Damages Due? 
 
 Any opportunity for monopoly profits naturally attracts new investment. Firms inside the 
market will try to increase output, and firms outside will try to enter. The monopolist or aspiring 
monopolist may respond by various acts designed to discourage such competition. These acts 
include the "exclusionary practices" identified by courts as supporting a Sherman § 2 
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monopolization or attempt offense.1  Acts thought to facilitate monopoly pricing also include 
tying arrangements in which the injury falls upon a competitor in the tied product market, and 
exclusive dealing contracts, concerted refusals to deal and other concerted conduct. More 
problematically, they may also include mergers, resale price maintenance and nonprice restraints. 
 
 In all these cases, the plaintiff generally claims damages for what may be loosely 
characterized as lost profits. The basis of the loss may be a reduction in market share, a smaller 
markup per unit sold, an existing firm's loss of investment or business assets, or preclusion from 
entry into a profitable business. In most such cases, the measure of damages is so imprecise that 
"loss of the opportunity to do business" would describe the plaintiff's loss more accurately than 
"lost profits," which suggests a sum that is quantifiable with a fair amount of precision. 
 
 When a plaintiff proves the existence of a price fixing conspiracy and demonstrates that 
she purchased the cartelized product, the inference is strong that the plaintiff suffered 
anticompetitive injury. In the case of exclusionary practices, the inference of anticompetitive 
injury is more ambiguous, even if the fact of the antitrust violation is clearly established. Under the 
"antitrust injury" doctrine developed in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., the 
plaintiff may recover damages only for anticompetitive injury—that is, injury which "flows from 
that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."2 
 
 This ambiguity in the relationship between conduct and injury in exclusionary practices 
cases results from two things. First, the phenomenon that governed the Brunswick decision itself 
was the "incipiency" test under which conduct is evaluated under the Clayton Act. Practices such 
as mergers, tying arrangements and exclusive dealing are illegal when they merely "tend to" create 
a monopoly, or where their effect "may be" substantially to lessen competition.3  Under the 
incipiency test, conduct is often condemned on the theory that if it were allowed to continue, 
monopoly might emerge at some future time, even though it has not done so yet. The most 
extreme form of the incipiency test is applied to mergers. Even under the relatively lenient 
standards established in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the threshold of illegality for 
mergers is far lower than will support any inference that the post-merger firm is a monopolist or is 
actually engaging in collusion or an exclusionary practice.4 
 
 The incipiency test raises the likelihood that conduct condemned under the Clayton Act 
                                                        
1 See Chs. 6–8. 
 
2 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 697 (1977). 
 
3 For example, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1520 
(1962), noting that the Celler–Kefauver amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act were designed to 
arrest mergers "at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition * * * was still in its 
incipiency." 
 
4 See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, § 12.4. 
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has not caused any anticompetitive injury at all at the time of litigation. In such cases injunctive 
relief might be appropriate: the private plaintiff might wish to protect itself from threatened 
anticompetitive conduct. However, damages based on anticompetitive injury will not be owing 
until anticompetitive injury has actually occurred.5 
 
 The second problem with private damages actions for exclusionary practices is more 
pervasive, and is a function of severe limitations on the judicial fact-finding process. By definition, 
anticompetitive acts cause public injuries. Competition is that state of affairs that maximizes social 
wealth, and any deviation from competition impoverishes society as a whole. But private plaintiffs 
do not sue in order to vindicate public injuries. They wish to vindicate private injuries—their own. 
Unfortunately, both efficiency-creating and efficiency-destroying practices can cause substantial 
private injuries. The problem is particularly acute when the plaintiff and defendant are 
competitors, for nothing succeeds like efficiency in injuring one's competitors.6 
 
 If one principle can be said to underlie the "antitrust injury" doctrine developed in 
Brunswick, it is that a plaintiff should be able to recover damages only if its own private injury and 
injury to the public coincide in some way. Many efficiency-creating practices are of marginal 
legality at the time they are undertaken. A rule that permitted a plaintiff to recover for all injuries 
once an antitrust violation is shown to have occurred could yield outrageous overdeterrence. That 
in turn could encourage firms to avoid efficient, aggressive conduct that might subsequently be 
characterized as an antitrust violation. 
 
Damages for Lost Sales and Market Share 
 
 In most cases involving exclusionary practices the plaintiff seeks compensation for what is 
generally characterized as "lost profits."7  Such actions include competitor lawsuits alleging illegal 
monopolization, attempt to monopolize or predatory pricing, tying arrangements or exclusive 
                                                        
5 See Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1127 
(1976). See also Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 152 F.3d 
588, 591 (7th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1071, 119 S.Ct. 804 (1999) (awarding an 
injunction when plaintiff could show causation but not damages because there was no way of 
measuring the latter). 
 
6 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Merger Actions for Damages, 35 Hastings L.J. (1984). 
 
7 For example, H.J., Inc. v. ITT, 867 F.2d 1531, 1549 (8th Cir.1989) ("the present value of profits 
lost as a result of [the defendant's] improper actions"); Sciambra v. Graham News, 841 F.2d 651, 
657 (5th Cir.1988) (lost profits, or going concern value as an alternative for firms excluded 
entirely from the market). See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National 
Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1367 (9th Cir.1986) ("A plaintiff's antitrust damages are to be 
calculated 'by a comparison of profits, price and values as affected by the conspiracy, with what 
they would have been in its absence under freely competitive conditions.' "). 
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dealing, illegal mergers, concerted refusals to deal, and violations of the Robinson–Patman Act. 
Also included are actions brought by firms who deal with or formerly dealt with the defendant, 
such as terminated distributors or retailers. The latter lawsuits often allege illegal vertical price or 
nonprice restraints. However, they might also allege any one of the antitrust violations listed 
above. 
 
 Once standing, violation, causation and antitrust injury have been established,8 
computation of damages in such cases is generally the same regardless of the nature of the 
substantive violation. However, the nature of the violation and the pre-litigation relationship 
between the defendant and plaintiff will be a factor in the court's decision about how much of the 
plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant's violation and how much resulted from the plaintiff's 
own actions or from other causes. 
 
 Actions for "lost profits," or loss of the opportunity to do business, are generally of three 
kinds: 1) actions in which the plaintiff continues to be a going concern but alleges that it lost sales 
or market share as a result of the defendant's violation, or that the antitrust violation increased its 
cost of doing business; 2) actions in which the plaintiff alleges that it was put out of business by 
the violation;9 3) actions in which the plaintiff alleges that the violation precluded it from ever 
entering business in the first place. 
 
 In all cases the principle underlying the computation of damages is that the plaintiff is 
entitled to be put in a position, ignoring trebling, that it would have been in had the 
anticompetitive conduct not occurred. This generally means that the court must entertain certain 
assumptions that cannot be established with anything approaching certainty—for example, that 
the plaintiff's business would have continued to do as well as it did before the violation occurred. 
 
 When the plaintiff was established in business before the violation occurred and remains in 
business thereafter, courts generally estimate the plaintiff's loss by one of three methods: the 
"before-and-after" method, the "yardstick" method, or the "market share" method. The first two 
of these methods are also used to estimate overcharge damages. 
 
 Courts currently disagree about whether the "yardstick" and "before-and-after" 
methodologies are the exclusive means by which a plaintiff can prove its damages. The trend is to 
require that damages be measured by one of these methodologies. For example, in Marshfield 
Clinic the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff who could not prove damages under either 
methodology was not entitled to collect them.10 Some courts have suggested that alternative 
                                                        
8 See Ch. 16. 
9 For example, Sciambra v. Graham News Co., 841 F.2d 651, 657 (5th Cir.1988) (terminated 
dealer). 
 
10 Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 152 F.3d 588, 592 (7th 
Cir.1998), cert. Denied, 525 U.S. 1071, 119 S.Ct. 804 (1999). 
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methodologies may be acceptable when the data for using either of the generally accepted 
methodologies are unavailable.11  The Conwood decision in the Sixth Circuit went much further, 
permitting damages to be proven by a novel and untested methodology even when the data were 
available for both the "yardstick" and "before-and-after" tests.12  As discussed in § 16.8c, not only 
was the methodology novel, it was also based on faulty economic reasoning and ignored many 
market factors unrelated to the defendant's anticompetitive conduct that had a significant impact 
on the plaintiff's growth. Conwood makes a good case for extremely harsh scrutiny of novel 
damages methodologies, particularly when the data for the traditional methodologies are readily 
available, as they were in that case. 
 
Before–and–After Method 
 
 In the "before-and-after" method the court looks at the plaintiff's business before the 
violation occurred, during the violation period, and after the violation ended, and estimates the 
amount that the violation reduced the plaintiff's profits. In its simplest form the theory looks at the 
plaintiff's net profits before and after the injury period, discounts all dollars to their present value, 
and gives the plaintiff a sum that, before trebling, will bring its earnings during the injury period 
up to the same average level as its earnings during the noninjury periods.13  For example, suppose 
that the plaintiff establishes that the defendant engaged in predatory pricing during the years 
1995–1998. The plaintiff's profits for the period 1992–1999, in constant dollars, were as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      1992:     $60,000       
 
      1993:     $50,000       
 
                                                        
11 State of New York v. Julius Nasso Concrete, 202 F.3d 82, 88–89 (2d Cir.2000) ("dearth of 
market information" may lighten plaintiff's evidentiary burden). Accord Eleven Line v. North Tex. 
State Soccer Ass'n, Inc., 213 F.3d 198, 207 (5th Cir.2000). 
 
12 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 784 (6th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1148, 123 S.Ct. 876 (2003). Conventional "yardstick" and "before and after" 
methodologies showed zero damages; the expert's alternative methodology ended up with an 
award of actually damages of $350 million, or more than one billion dollars after trebling.  
 
13 See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 566, 51 S.Ct. 248, 
251–52 (1931); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 266, 66 S.Ct. 574, 580 (1946); 2 
Antitrust Law ¶ 397 (3d ed. 2007). 
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      1994:     $60,000       
 
      1995:     $35,000     (violation year) 
 
      1996:     $20,000     (violation year) 
 
      1997:     ($5,000)     (violation year) 
 
      1998:     $10,000     (violation year) 
 
      1999:     $50,000       
 
 The plaintiff's average profits during the nonpredatory years were $55,000. Before 
trebling, the plaintiff is entitled to an amount that will bring its profits up to $55,000 for each of 
the predatory years—$20,000 for 1995, $35,000 for 1996, $60,000 for 1997, and $45,000 for 
1998. The plaintiff's damages will be $160,000 x 3, or $480,000.14 
 
 Obviously, the above example ignores dozens of contingencies that could affect 
profitability in any market. At one time courts were generally of the view that the highly 
contingent nature of the before-and-after approach rendered such damages estimates far too 
speculative. In Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,15 however, the Supreme Court held that any 
imprecision in the calculation of damages was the result of the defendant's wrongful conduct; 
therefore the defendant should bear the risk of any uncertainty of measurement. 
 
 If the contingencies affecting the plaintiff's profitability are random or unknown, the 
before-and-after method is as likely to understate as to overstate the plaintiff's loss. As a result, 
simple use of the method without consideration of truly random or completely unknown 
contingencies does not really transfer the risk of uncertainty to the defendant but rests it equally 
on both parties. However, the advantage is clearly with the plaintiff if the plaintiff is permitted to 
have every plausible assumption respecting a nonrandom element in its favor. 
 
 Information about the plaintiff's performance during the noninjury years may force some 
adjustment of the before-and-after computation. For example, if the plaintiff's profits and market 
share were decreasing steadily even before the violation, then a mere average of the plaintiff's 
performance in a half-dozen pre-violation years will overstate the damages. The reverse might be 
                                                        
14 For one application, see Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir.1983), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1007, 105 S.Ct. 1874 (1985). The court approved the jury determination, 
notwithstanding the possibility that some of the losses could have resulted from things other than 
the antitrust violation. 
 
15 327 U.S. 251, 264, 66 S.Ct. 574, 579 (1946). 
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true if the plaintiff's profits and market share had been steadily increasing.16   Likewise, if a larger 
buyer or seller entered or exited the market during the injury period, or if the demand curve for 
the product shifted dramatically during the injury period, these adjustments must be taken into 
account.17  For example, if a slide rule manufacturer was injured by a competitor's antitrust 
violation at the same time that electronic calculators were introduced into the retail market, it 
would be inappropriate to attribute the entire decline in the plaintiff's sales to the antitrust 
violation.18 
 
 Accommodation of all requisite factors has made the before-and-after method complex, 
and its use often requires higher forms of mathematics such as multiple and nonlinear regression 
analysis and—most importantly—a qualified economic or statistical expert. 
 
 The extreme complexities of lost profits studies using the before-and-after method can be 
seen in a series of cases alleging monopolization and predatory pricing against American 
Telephone and Telegraph Co.19 In Litton the damages study took two years and covered a giant 
host of variables. It also made a number of assumptions that the defendant challenged 
unsuccessfully—such as, that the plaintiff would have received its operating certificate promptly 
absent the defendant's objections, that the plaintiff would have invested far more in research and 
development than it had actually planned on investing, that the growth rate of AT & T's 
competitors in the terminal equipment market would be steadily upward, and that the plaintiff 
                                                        
16 However, businesses that are initially successful frequently exhibit a profit or market share 
growth rate during the early years that they will not sustain indefinitely. For example, see Volasco 
Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 391 (6th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 
907, 83 S.Ct. 721 (1963), where the court refused to believe that the plaintiff's business would 
have continued indefinitely to grow at a rate of 247% per year. 
 
17 See Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 
U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1728 (1988) (before-and-after method overstated damages when overall 
market demand for woodstoves diminished during violation period, for reasons having nothing to 
do with the violation. "All [the plaintiff] did to prove damages was to compare his average profits 
for several years before and several years during the period of unlawful activity. Post hoc ergo 
propter hoc is not a valid methodology of damage calculation, especially when it is apparent that 
other causal factors are at work.") See also Richard C. Hoyt, Dale C. Dahl & Stuart D. Gibson, 
Comprehensive Models for Assessing Lost Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 Minn.L.Rev. 1233, 
1236 (1976). 
 
18 In such a case the market share method would be more appropriate. The relevant question is not 
how much the plaintiff's gross sales declined, but how much its share of the slide rule market 
declined.  
 
19 Litton System, Inc. v. AT & T, 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073, 104 
S.Ct. 984 (1984); see also MCI Communications Corp. v. AT & T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891, 104 S.Ct. 234 (1983). 
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would continue to face the same costs that the defendant faced.20 
 
 However, an equally complex lost profits study by the Southern Pacific Communications 
Co., which operated long-distance microwave systems that competed with AT & T's long distance 
service, foundered because it failed to account for the growing market share of satellite 
communication, and the increasing tendency of large purchasers of long distance service to build 
their own internal microwave systems. Furthermore, the study appeared to project a rate of 
growth that exceeded the plaintiff's capacity.21 
 
Yardstick Method 
 
 The "yardstick" method of estimating lost profits can sometimes simplify the court's 
calculations, although it can be used only in limited situations. Under the yardstick approach the 
plaintiff attempts to identify a market or firm similar to the plaintiff in all respects but for the 
impact of the antitrust violation. For example, in Bigelow, the plaintiff compared its own revenue 
during the injury period with that earned by a comparable theater operated by one of the 
defendants.22  In such circumstances, if the markets of the two firms are identical, and if the 
plaintiff's firm and the firm used for comparison stand in the same relative position in those 
markets, offer the same product mix, have comparable managements and are comparable in all 
other respects, then the fact finder may infer that the two would have had comparable revenues or 
profits but for the violation. 
 
 The above statement of the "yardstick" methodology gives some indication of its inherent 
weaknesses. To the extent that either the markets or firms being compared are dissimilar, the 
yardstick theory will not produce a trustworthy estimate of what the plaintiff would have earned 
but for the defendant's conduct. The method therefore works best in markets that are both local 
                                                        
20 Litton, 700 F.2d at 822–24. 
 
21 Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. AT & T Co., 556 F.Supp. 825, 1060 (D.D.C.1982), 
affirmed, 740 F.2d 1011 (D.C.Cir.1984). Other courts have also been critical of speculative 
damage assumptions. See McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 806–807 (9th Cir.1988) 
(rejecting expert's damage study for not carefully examining underlying market conditions, and 
which projected that growth of sales would exceed 40% annually while expenses would remain 
constant); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 382–383 (7th 
Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934, 107 S.Ct. 1574 (1987) (severely criticizing expert damage 
study as nothing more than advocacy); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler–Benz 
Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1044 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 
1753 (1988) (expert damages study failed to separate out losses caused by lawful conduct). 
 
22 Note __. See Robert D. Blair & Amanda Kay Esquibel, An Econometric Approach to 
Constructing a Yardstick Model of Damages in Lost Profit Cases, 72 Den. Univ. L. Rev. 113 
(1994). 
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and relatively homogeneous.23 
 
 Lost Market Share 
 
 The third measure of damages for lost profits is generally referred to as the "market share" 
theory. Actually that term is a misnomer insofar as it suggests that use of the theory invariably 
requires calculation of the impact of the antitrust violation on the plaintiff's market share. The 
theory might more appropriately be called the "lost output" theory, because frequently it purports 
to measure the absolute reduction in output suffered by the plaintiff, rather than its percentage 
decline of some relevant market. 
 
 Theoretically, the market share approach can be useful when the antitrust violation is 
internal to a market, but the market as a whole was also influenced by external shocks during the 
violation period. For example, suppose that the plaintiff establishes an illegal boycott in the retail 
gasoline market during a certain period. During the same period, however, the OPEC cartel 
tripled the price of gasoline, and demand dropped substantially as a result. Under the before-and-
after method, it would be impossible to attribute part of the plaintiff's lost profits to the defendants 
and part to OPEC. Further, the yardstick method might not be available because there is no 
second market whose characteristics are sufficiently similar. 
 
 Presumably, however, the OPEC cartel affected all gasoline sellers proportionately—that 
is, they all suffered a loss of sales that varied with their volume. As a result their relative shares of 
the overall market were not affected by OPEC, even though their absolute volume was. If the 
plaintiff can show that during the violation period its market share dropped from 7% to 3%, it 
may be possible to separate out the impact of OPEC and compute the damages on the basis of 
lost market share.24 
                                                        
23 See Home Placement Serv. v. Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 1205 & n. 7 (1st 
Cir.1987) (rejecting yardstick approach when there was inadequate evidence that the plaintiff firm 
and yardstick firm operated in similar situations and conducted their business in a similar manner); 
National Farmers' Org. v. Associated Milk Producers, 850 F.2d 1286, 1294–1298 (8th Cir.1988) 
(approving yardstick measure notwithstanding numerous differences in two markets, particularly 
since differences tended to underestimate, rather than overestimate, plaintiff's damages); Metrix 
Warehouse case, note __ at 1044 n. 21 (approving method generally); Rose Confections, Inc. v. 
Ambrosia Chocolate Co., 816 F.2d 381, 393–394 (8th Cir.1987) (rejecting study comparing West 
Coast market and dissimilar midwestern market); Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New England Toyota 
Distributor, 708 F.2d 814, 821 & n. 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894, 104 S.Ct. 241 (1983) 
(approving use where jury apparently took differences between plaintiff and yardstick dealer into 
account). 
 
24 See General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n., 830 F.2d 716, 726 (7th 
Cir.1987) (approving jury verdict awarding zero damages on market share study); Dolphin Tours, 
Inc. v. Pacifico Creative Serv., 773 F.2d 1506, 1511–1513 (9th Cir.1985) (market share study 
good enough to avoid summary judgment). 
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 In practice, the market share method often operates as a variant of either the before-and-
after or yardstick theories. For example, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. the 
plaintiff convinced the court that its market share of the Canadian television market, which was in 
fact 3%, would have been 16% but for the antitrust violation.25  The plaintiff arrived at the 16% 
figure by showing that the Canadian and American television markets were similar and that its 
market share of the American market varied upwards from 16% during the violation period. Thus 
the market share approach adopted in Zenith was little more than a variation on the yardstick 
approach. 
 
 Once the expert has identified a certain loss of market share as the result of the antitrust 
violation, then he or she must devise an empirical formula that links market share in the relevant 
market to profitability. Profits are not always proportional to market share. For example, 
sometimes one firm will be much more profitable than another firm of the same size, and often a 
firm twice as big as a second firm will not earn twice the profits. Furthermore, such a formula will 
not generally take into account relevant economies of scale. Nevertheless, the amount of deviation 
with respect to such a formula may be within the range of error permitted by the courts in 
estimating damages. 
 
 Another problem of the Zenith market share approach is that it does not consider the 
substantial stochastic elements in the determination of any particular firm's market share. The fact 
that a firm was successful in obtaining a 16% share of one market is not good evidence that it 
would obtain a 16% share of a different market, even if the two markets are similar. Although 
minimum firm size in a market might be predetermined by relevant economies of scale, the 
individual sizes of particular firms in that market is largely a matter of chance. To take an 
example, suppose that 100 firms start out in a new market (home computers) in which minimum 
efficient scale is 5%. The firms go through a long period of competition, mergers, antitrust 
violations, lobbying, advertising and innovation. What will be the market structure after 20 years? 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
25 401 U.S. 321, 91 S.Ct. 795, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 1015, 91 S.Ct. 1247 (1971). See also 
Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 996–97 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 716 
F.2d 901 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1594 (1984). The plaintiff sold its 
hydraulic hose bundles to two groups of customers, end users and manufacturers of equipment 
that employed the hoses. The defendant allegedly attempted to monopolize the second market but 
not the first. The plaintiff's expert produced a study indicating that the plaintiff's share of the end 
user market, in which the violations had little or no effect, was 80%. However, its share of the 
equipment market, which was affected by the violation, was 63%. Then the expert produced a 
formula correlating the plaintiff's profits with market share, and estimated the lost profit that 
resulted from the 17% loss of market share in the affected market. The court approved this 
method of estimating damages, but finally rejected the model because it failed to segregate 
Sherman § 1 damages, in which the court found no liability, from Sherman § 2 damages, where it 
had. 
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 Assuming no tacit or express collusion, it is likely that there would be no remaining firms 
with a market share substantially less than 5%. That means twenty or fewer firms would survive. 
Which twenty? Ex ante, there is no way to tell, unless some of the starters were obviously more 
efficient or innovative than others. Furthermore, after this market reaches equilibrium we would 
probably not find a market with twenty firms of the same size. More likely there would be fewer 
than twenty firms. Some might have market shares on the order of 30%, others of 15%, and 
others of 10%. The fact that Zenith was fortunate enough to achieve a 16% share of the American 
market tells us very little about what share it would acquire in a different market.26 
 
 One answer to this criticism of the market share theory is that if the determinants of 
individual market share are truly random, the plaintiff's share in the Canadian market was equally 
likely to be less than or more than its actual share of the American market. In that case, however, 
assuming that we were faced with a market in which several equal-sized firms all entered the 
business at the same time, it would be more plausible to select the mode among the existing firms 
as the size that Zenith most likely would have reached but for the violation. This number could be 
either far larger or far smaller than Zenith's 16% share of the American market.27 
 
 A more acceptable variation of the market share theory is evidence about how much a 
plaintiff's output has been reduced as a result of a particular antitrust violation. If the plaintiff can 
point to particular sales which it lost as a result of the defendant's violation, and if the plaintiff can 
then show its rate of profit per sale, damages will be relatively easy to compute. For example, in 
Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons the defendant violated the Sherman Act and the 
Robinson–Patman Act by bribing state officials to accept the defendant's bids for sale of fish food, 
rather than the bids of the plaintiff or other competitors.28  The plaintiff was able to show that 
when the bribery had not been a factor, its bids were successful about one-fourth of the time. 
From this the court inferred that the plaintiff's loss of sales equaled one-fourth of the volume 
covered by bids that the plaintiff lost to the defendant as a result of the bribery. Lost profits were 
estimated on the basis of this lost sales volume. 
 
 Sometimes a combination of the "before-and-after" and "market share" method of 
computing damages can yield a reasonable estimate, particularly when the plaintiff operates in 
several markets but the antitrust violation occurs in only one. For example, Moore v. Jas. H. 
                                                        
26 See Frederic M. Scherer & David R. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance 141–46 (3d ed. 1990). 
 
27 However, some of the determinants of market share may be internal to the firm. For example, if 
Zenith's 16% share of the American market was a result of good management, and if the same 
management would be responsible for entry into the Canadian market, then ex ante Zenith might 
have an advantage over competitors in the Canadian market. 
 
28 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936, 86 S.Ct. 1067 (1966). 
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Matthews & Co.29 was a competitor-brought tying arrangement case. The plaintiff, which 
manufactured grave markers, successfully established that the defendant cemeteries illegally 
required purchasers of cemetery lots to purchase their grave markers and installation from the 
cemeteries as well. The Ninth Circuit approved evidence that in cemeteries not subject to grave 
marker ties the plaintiff had been able to attain a market share of 50%, while its share in the 
restricted cemeteries was only 4%. In addition, when three cemeteries settled out of court and 
agreed to discontinue the restrictions, the plaintiff's share of sales in those cemeteries rose to 50%. 
Therefore the plaintiff was entitled to damages based on the difference between the market share 
it actually obtained in the restricted cemeteries, and the 50% share it likely would have obtained 
absent the violation. 
 
Damages and Disaggregation 
 
 Several courts have held that if part of the plaintiff's loss in profits was caused by unlawful 
conduct and part by lawful conduct, the plaintiff is entitled to collect damages only for the 
former.30  As one court noted: 
 
The way Memorex [one of the plaintiffs] structured its damage claim there was no basis in 
the record for the jury to determine what the effect on damages would be if it found one 
or more of the challenged acts lawful. Thus, if one of [defendant] IBM's acts was not a 
violation of the antitrust laws, much of the damage claim would become invalid.31 
                                                        
29 682 F.2d 830, 836–37 (9th Cir.1982). In Bigelow, note __, the plaintiff submitted damages 
evidence under both the before-and-after and yardstick theories. The measurement under the 
before-and-after theory was $125,000, under the yardstick theory $116,000, and the jury returned 
a verdict of $120,000. 
 
30 See Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 200 (1st 
Cir.), appeal after remand, 175 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.1999) (vacating common damages award for 
monopolization and price discrimination violations when only the latter verdict was upheld); 
Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 997 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 716 F.2d 
901 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1594 (1984); MCI Communications 
Corp. v. AT & T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1160–63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891, 104 S.Ct. 
234 (1983); Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.1975). See Comment, 
Segregation of Antitrust Damages: An Excessive Burden on Private Plaintiffs, 72 Calif.L.Rev. 
403 (1984). 
 
 
31 ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F.Supp. 423, 434 (N.D.Cal.1978), affirmed 
per curiam sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 
452 U.S. 972, 101 S.Ct. 3126 (1981). See also City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 
F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct. 305 (1992) (city charged utility 
with denying access to transmission lines, filing discriminatory rates, group boycott; only the first 
may have been antitrust violation); United States Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1378–
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 The one available escape valve from such a high standard of economic proof may be a rule 
that places the "burden of disaggregation" on the defendant. That is, if there is no way that either 
party can separate those damages elements caused by wrongful conduct from those caused by 
conduct held to be lawful, then the plaintiff will be permitted to recover for both. Whether such a 
rule actually exists is doubtful.32 Whether it should exist is even more dubious. Just as a strict rule 
requiring a plaintiff to separate out damages caused by illegal acts would impose an impossible 
burden on the plaintiff, so would a similar rule imposed upon the defendant create an impossible 
burden. It would permit plaintiffs consistently to recover for both antitrust violations as well as 
injuries caused by efficiency and competition on the merits. 
 
 The problem of assigning a particular amount of damages to a particular exclusionary 
practice can be made more tractable if the plaintiff bases its damage claim on something other 
than lost profits. For example, suppose the plaintiff alleges that a competitor monopolist 1) failed 
to predisclose new technology; and 2) engaged in "sham" enforcement of an invalid patent.33  The 
plaintiff then loses on the first claim but wins on the second. Attributing a given profit or market 
share loss to one or the other of these practices could be impossible, unless the effects appeared in 
different markets or at different times. However, in the latter case the plaintiff could show that it 
incurred certain costs in litigating against the defendant. In Premier Electric, the court held that 
litigation costs may be recovered as antitrust damages when the underlying violation is use of 
"sham" litigation to raise rivals' costs.34 This measure of damages is much more plausible. Indeed, 
lost competitor investment rather than lost anticipated profits provides a better estimator of 
competitor injuries for a variety of reasons.35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1379 (2d Cir.1988); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler–Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 
1044 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1753 (1988); Farley Transp. Co. v. 
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1350–1352 (9th Cir.1985). 
 
32 See the MCI case, note __ above, at 1161–63; City of Mishawaka v. American Elect. Power 
Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096, 101 S.Ct. 892 (1981), rehearing 
denied, 450 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 1421 (1981); R.S.E. Inc. v. Pennsylvania Supply, Inc., 523 
F.Supp. 954, 964–65 (M.D.Pa.1981). 
 
33 See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, § 7.11. 
 
34 Premier Electrical Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Assn., 814 F.2d 358, 371–372 (7th 
Cir.1987). See also Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 562 F.2d 365 (6th 
Cir.1977) (awarding costs of defending anticompetitive patent infringement suit as antitrust 
damages).  And see Xerox Corp. v. Media Sciences Int'l, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (costs of defending improper infringement action based on anticompetitive design of 
complementary product could form basis of antitrust damages). 
 
35 See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy,§ 17.6e. 
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 One indefensible approach to disaggregation is the one taken in the Sixth Circuit's 
Conwood decision. The expert produced a damages study that simply measured the plaintiff's 
market share growth and did not even purport to distinguish among the effects of unlawful 
conduct, lawful conduct, and market factors completely outside of the defendant's control, 
including the entry of two new firms. The court held that the plaintiff could carry its burden 
simply by instructing the jury that it should find damages only for the unlawful conduct.36  But if 
the expert cannot separate out the consequences of unlawful conduct why would anyone think the 
jury could do so? As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in rejecting this approach, such an instruction 
is useless unless there is some "basis in the record for quantifying" the loses that result from 
unlawful conduct.37 
 
Terminated Dealers and Firms Driven From Business 
 
 When the plaintiff alleges that it was driven completely out of business by the defendant's 
activity, a new level of uncertainty must be considered. If the plaintiff's demise was gradual, then 
computation of damages during the years of decline will involve the methods outlined above. In 
addition, however, the plaintiff will be entitled to an award that will compensate for the loss of its 
business. If the plaintiff's demise is sudden, as it might be in a dealer termination case, then the 
plaintiff is entitled only to the latter sum. 
 
 Courts generally estimate damages for the destruction of a business by two different 
methods: the discounted present value of anticipated profits, or the "going-concern" method, 
which essentially asks what the business was worth to a reasonable buyer before the violation 
occurred. 
 
 In most cases involving the complete destruction of a business, the court attempts to 
determine the plaintiff's profitability before the impact of the antitrust violation, and from this 
evidence of profits to project a stream of future profits. Then, under the first approach this stream 
of future profits will be discounted to its present value. Under the second approach, the evidence 
of profits will be used to estimate the "going concern" value of the business.38  In any case, loss of 
                                                        
36 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 784 (6th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1148, 123 S.Ct. 876 (2003). 
 
37 Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1224 (9th Cir.1997), 
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094, 118 S.Ct. 1560 (1998). 
 
38 For example,  PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 171 Fed. Appx. 464 (5th 
Cir. Mar. 20 2006), rev'd on other grounds,  551 U.S. 877  (2007) (approving expert’s damages 
methodology of projecting future profits and discounting to present value, although apparently 
without accounting for risk);  Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1580 (11th 
Cir.1983) (measuring going concern value by comparing FMV of business before and after 
antitrust violation).   For a discussion and critique of these methodologies, see 2A Antitrust Law ¶ 
393d (3d ed. 2007). 
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future profits and loss of going concern value are alternative measures of injury. The value of the 
business as a going concern is nothing more than the present value of its profits, plus its 
salvageable assets. A court should therefore award either the present value of lost future profits or 
the market value of the business as a going concern absent the violation, but not both.39 
 
 The easiest cases involving destruction of a business occur when the plaintiff has had a 
long period of established profitability and is then terminated immediately by the defendant. If the 
plaintiff made $100,000 per year for ten years before termination, then his damages equal the 
present value of a future stream of income of $100,000 per year.40   Alternatively, the "going 
concern" value of the business is the fair market value of a business capable of producing 
$100,000 per year in profits. 
 
 Few cases are that simple. In most, the plaintiff attempts to show that the business was 
likely to increase and therefore the loss of future profits was actually greater than the record of 
past profits indicates.41   The defendant may answer that the plaintiff's business was actually in 
decline and that the plaintiff would probably have gone out of business even if the antitrust 
violation had not occurred.42 Needless to say, in all such cases the computation of the plaintiff's 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
39 Sciambra v. Graham News Co., 841 F.2d 651, 657 (5th Cir.1988) (lost profits and going 
concern are alternative measures); Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 
1560, 1579 (11th Cir.1983); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 886–87 (8th Cir.1979), 
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1852 (1980). 
 
40 In the case of terminated dealers, many of which are sole proprietorships, courts sometimes 
look at the age of the plaintiff and measure how long it is likely that the plaintiff would have 
stayed in business. Thus in Graphic Products, id., the court determined from the age of the 
plaintiff's principals that they would likely work for ten more years. From this the jury estimated 
the present value of ten years of future profits, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 717 F.2d at 
1582 n. 42. But see Mid–Texas Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT & T Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1391–
92 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 618 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 
286 (1980), where the court held that the plaintiff (in this case an ongoing concern) could not 
project lost profits twenty-seven years into the future. This concern with the sole proprietor's age 
apparently assumes that the business has no sale value when the proprietor retires. If a business is 
truly a "going concern" replacement of its manager will not ordinarily affect its value. Of course, a 
franchise might be made nontransferable by the franchisor. In that case the business might end 
when the current franchisee retires. But such a case is the exception rather than the rule. 
 
41 For example, see Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 23 n. 12 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S.Ct. 246 (1974), where the court upheld a damages award for 
future profits even though the business had never earned a profit. 
 
42 See General Electric Credit Corp. v. Grubbs, 478 F.2d 53, 58–59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 854, 94 S.Ct. 153 (1973), appeal after remand, 513 F.2d 783 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 363 (1975). 
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damages is at least as complex as it is in the situation when the plaintiff remains a going concern. 
 
 In dealer termination cases, the plaintiff usually alleges that it was terminated for 
noncompliance with an illegal restriction, such as resale price maintenance or an unlawful 
territorial restraint. The plaintiff may be able to show that it would have made more profits during 
its period of operation had the restraint not been imposed. The court may give an award for the 
shortfall in past profits and augment the projection of future profits to account for the effect of the 
restraint.43  However, in its Isaksen and Local Beauty decisions, the Seventh Circuit held that 
damages may not be based on the ability of the plaintiff to profit from an antitrust violation 
imposed on others.44  The plaintiffs in both cases claimed their dealerships were terminated 
because they refused to participate in the defendants' resale price maintenance schemes. The 
plaintiffs' damages theories were based on the premise that they would be free to set their own 
price, while RPM would continue to be imposed on other dealers. The court concluded that 
"damages based on profits made by a plaintiff because of the existence of an antitrust violation are 
not recoverable."45  One implication of Local Beauty is that in estimating the plaintiffs damages 
the court must subtract out all the effects of an antitrust violation, not merely those that injured 
the plaintiff. To take an obvious example, if a competitor successfully challenges a merger, its 
damages should be based on profits in the pre-merger market, not in the more concentrated post-
merger market. 
 
 The going concern measure of damages for destruction of a business also begins with an 
estimate of future profits, and then capitalizes that estimate, using a multiple that accounts for 
such factors as the degree of risk, the established growth rate of the particular market, the nature 
of the arrangement between the plaintiff and its supplier, and the economic outlook. Measurement 
on the basis of expected future profits and measurement by loss of going concern value are 
equivalent, and should generally yield similar results.46 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
43 Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068, 1081–82 (2d Cir.1980); Pitchford v. PEPI, 
Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 2649 (1976), on remand, 
435 F.Supp. 685 (1977), affirmed, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981, 99 
S.Ct. 1790 (1979); Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 660–62 (5th Cir.1975), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 942, 96 S.Ct. 1409 (1976). 
 
44 Isaksen, note __; Local Beauty Supply v. Lamaur, 787 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.1986). 
 
45 Local Beauty, 787 F.2d at 1202–1203; see also Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., 
737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018, 105 S.Ct. 432 (1984), which implies similar 
analysis of maximum RPM claims; and Indiana Grocery v. Super Valu Stores, 864 F.2d 1409 (7th 
Cir.1989) (same). 
 
46 See Tire Sales Corp. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 637 F.2d 467 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 
U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 1999 (1981); Taxi Weekly, Inc. v. Metropolitan Taxicab Bd. of Trade Inc., 
539 F.2d 907, 914–15 (2d Cir.1976). 
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Damages for Precluded Entry 
 
 Few claims for damages are more difficult to assess than the plaintiff's allegation that an 
antitrust violation destroyed its "business" even before it made its first sale. Plaintiffs in such cases 
often claim lost future profits. Such claims must be taken with a grain of salt, however, for as 
many as 90% of small businesses fail during the initial years of operation.47 
 
 The failure rate aside, quantifying the amount of profits that would likely be earned by a 
firm that has never completed entry into the business is a truly extraordinary task. Clearly, the 
"before-and-after" approach is inapplicable: there was no "before" and there will be no "after."48  
The "yardstick" approach of measuring damages requires the fact finder to locate a firm similar to 
the plaintiff's in a similar market. However, in this case there is no "similar" firm. As a result even 
these poor estimators of damages are of little value. 
 
 At the same time, the vulnerability of unestablished firms makes them particularly easy 
targets for antitrust violations. In fact, many strategic, entry-deterring practices are designed to 
foreclose rivals before entry is accomplished.49  Any rule that barred recovery by unestablished 
firms would encourage incumbents to deter competitors early, when they are easy targets and 
when the incumbents could be free of damages liability. As a result, a well-designed deterrence 
policy must permit some kind of redress by unestablished firms injured by anticompetitive 
practices. 
 
 These countervailing considerations—the poor profit prospects and problems of proof on 
the one hand, and the easy susceptibility of unestablished businesses to antitrust violations on the 
other—suggest two premises for any antitrust damages policy concerning the unestablished 
business: 1) unestablished businesses should be able to enforce the antitrust laws by means of 
                                                        
47 A.B Cochran, Small Business Mortality Rates: A Review of the Literature, 19 J. Small Bus. 
Mgmt. 50 (1981); Comment, Unestablished Businesses and Treble Damage Recovery Under 
Section Four of the Clayton Act, 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1076, 1079 (1982). On the methodologies, see 
2 Antitrust Law ¶ 392f2 (3d ed. 2007). 
 
48 See Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 200 (1st 
Cir.), appeal after remand, 175 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.1999) (not rejecting use of before-and-after 
approach completely, but concluding that it "requires an appraisal of the reliability of a firm's track 
record, and the length of that track record is one factor to consider ..."). 
 
49 For example, strategic pricing is probably used much more often to keep prospective rivals out 
of the market than to bankrupt firms already in business. See Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory 
Pricing; A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284 (1977); Oliver E. Williamson, 
"Antitrust Enforcement: Where It Has Been; Where It Is Going," in John V. Craven, ed., 
Industrial Organization, Antitrust, and Public Policy 41–68, 53 (1983). 
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damages actions; however 2) lost anticipated profits is not the best measure of damages. 
 
 The initial hurdle that most plaintiffs confront in cases of precluded entry is not damages 
but standing. This issue is discussed in § 16.5a. If a court finds the requisite injury and grants 
standing, it is generally willing to consider a claim for lost profits under more-or-less the same 
standards as those applied to established firms driven out of business.50 
 
 Estimation of lost profits in such situations is so speculative that the court's decision can 
be no more than arbitrary. Ex ante, no one could predict the market share or sales volume that 
could be attained by a prospective business, and no estimate of future profits can be made without 
some estimate of volume of sales. 
 
 A far more judicious approach, which would permit enforcement by precluded plaintiffs 
but guard against overdeterrence, is to award precluded entrants their sunk costs, plus the fair 
market value of any contractual obligations which they have already received but will be unable to 
perform as a result of the antitrust violations.51  "Sunk" costs refer here to investments that the 
plaintiff reasonably made into the business and which it will not be able to recover as a result of 
the violation. For example, a prospective entrant who has purchased a delivery truck will 
presumably be able to sell the truck and should recover only its net loss. By contrast, pre-opening 
advertising expenses, the cost of obtaining financing, losses caused by early termination of leases, 
wages and service fees paid for pre-opening activities are all "property" interests compensable 
under § 4 of the Clayton Act.52 
                                                        
50 See Central Telecommunic. v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d 711, 730 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 
480 U.S. 910, 107 S.Ct. 1358 (1987); Dolphin Tours, note __ at 1511; Terrell v. Household 
Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S.Ct. 246 
(1974). 
 
51 But see Robert D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70 Wash. L. 
Rev. 423, 452 (1995) (criticizing this basis for awarding damages). See also William B. Tye, 
Stephen H. Kalos & A. Lawrence Kolbe, How to Value a Lost Opportunity: Defining, Proving 
and Measuring Damages from Market Foreclosure, 17 Res. L. & Econ. 83 (1995). Courts have 
held that completed contracts are protected "property" under § 4 of the Clayton Act. North Tex. 
Producers Ass'n v. Young, 308 F.2d 235, 243 (5th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 929, 83 
S.Ct. 874 (1963); Peller v. International Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593, 596 (7th Cir.1955). 
 
52 See Duff v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320 (8th Cir.1962); and Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 
246 F.2d 368, 389–394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835, 78 S.Ct. 54 (1957) (holding that 
lost profits were too speculative for nascent firm, but awarding invested costs). Courts can and 
have facilitated such a rule by distinguishing between "business" and "property" interests under § 
4 of the Clayton Act. The precluded entrant's sunk costs and the value of its completed contracts 
are property interests. Its anticipated future profits, however, are uncertain "business" interests in 
which no property rights have been established. See Comment, Unestablished Businesses and 
Treble Damage Recovery Under Section Four of the Clayton Act, 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1076, 1094–
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Contribution; Joint and Several Liability 
 
Contribution is the right of one guilty defendant to force other participants in the same 
offense to pay a share of the damages award. Many states have adopted contribution rules for tort 
law, either by statute or by common law rule.53  In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 
Inc., however, the Supreme Court decided that neither the antitrust statutes nor the federal 
common law implied a right to contribution in federal antitrust cases.54  The current antitrust rule, 
therefore, is that a single defendant may have to pay the entire damages award, even though 
several co-conspirators participated in the violation that caused the plaintiff's injury. 
 
 The wisdom of a contribution rule in antitrust has been controversial, with a fair amount 
of literature on both sides of the question.55  The current rule of no contribution injects some 
arbitrariness into private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Theoretically, at the plaintiff's whim 
one defendant can be held liable for far more than treble the damages that it caused. Another, 
equally at fault, goes away free. This has prompted arguments that a no contribution rule is 
overdeterrent, because under it a single firm may be liable for very large damages. The answer, of 
course, is an argument that a no contribution rule is really underdeterrent, because some firms 
known to be guilty will not pay anything. 
 
 Both of the above judgments can be made only after the fact, however. At the time a firm 
decides whether to commit an antitrust violation it does not know whether it will have to pay 
damages for an injury actually caused by a co-conspirator, or whether the co-conspirator will have 
to pay. However, a no contribution rule may distort antitrust enforcement to the disadvantage of 
some potential defendants and the advantage of others. For example, if plaintiffs generally sue the 
largest available defendant rather than the smaller ones, the effect of a no contribution rule would 
be overdeterrence with respect to large firms and underdeterrence with respect to small ones. 
 
 However, the no contribution rule of Texas Industries reduces the overall costs of 
antitrust enforcement by encouraging defendants to settle before trial.56 For example, suppose that 
X, Y, and Z are co-conspirators sued by P. X, Y, and Z predict that if P wins it will collect 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
97 (1982). 
 
53 See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, Ch. 26 (2000). 
 
54  451 U.S. 630, 101 S.Ct. 2061 (1981). See also Minpeco, SA v. Conticommodity Servs., 677 
F.Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (dismissing contribution cross-claim). 
 
55 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust 
Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 Stan.L.Rev. 447 (1981). 
 
56 See Frank H. Easterbrook, William H. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among 
Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & Econ. 331 (1980). 
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$6,000,000 in damages, and that P's chances of winning are 50%. For each defendant, the 
expected liability is $1,000,000 (one-third of 50% of $6,000,000). The value of P's expected 
award is $3,000,000. 
 
 If X settles with P for $1,000,000, the law of claim reduction provides that P's future 
award will be reduced by that amount, to $5,000,000. P still has a 50% chance of winning. Now 
the expected liability of Y and Z is $1,250,000 (each has a 50% chance of paying the $5,000,000 
judgment, and there is a 50% chance that it will have to be paid). The first settlor comes out 
better than the two other firms. 
 
 The second settlor will come out second best. The expected liability to firms Y and Z is 
$1,250,000 each. P's expected recovery is $2,500,000 ($5,000,000 discounted by the 50% chance 
it will lose). Now suppose that Y settles for $1,250,000. If P later recovers from Z, the 
$5,000,000 will be reduced to $3,750,000 to reflect the settlement with Y. Z's expected liability is 
$1,875,000. 
 
 The result will be a race among the parties to settle. The eagerness of the defendants to 
settle first may yield higher settlements than would occur otherwise. In the example above, for 
instance, the first settlor will pay $1,000,000, while the second settlor can expect to pay 
$1,250,000. The firms will bid against each other to be the first settlor, and the initial settlement 
may well be more than $1,000,000. Once the first defendant has settled, the remaining defendants 
will bid against each other for the right to settle next. 
 
 A contribution rule, depending on its type, can discourage defendants from settling. In the 
same case, suppose that X settles early for $1,000,000, leaving P with a 50% chance of 
recovering $5,000,000 from Y and Z. If Y ends up paying a $5,000,000 damages award, Y will 
have a cause of action against Z for $2,000,000 and against X for $1,000,000 (that is, for an 
amount such that the total payment of all three defendants is the same.) In this case, Y's and Z's 
expected loss is $1,000,000 each, after discounting for the 50% likelihood of P's success. X, 
however, is in a less fortunate position. The $1,000,000 already paid is sunk costs that it is certain 
to lose. Its expected additional losses are $500,000, giving it expected total losses of $1,500,000. 
A contribution rule that does not create a special incentive for early settlement can make early 
settlors worse off (disregarding litigation costs) than nonsettlors. Thus any contribution rule that 
does not create an exception for early settlors is calculated to increase the costs of private 
antitrust enforcement.57 
 
 Finally, any right of contribution in antitrust cases will impose one additional social cost—
the cost of litigating the contribution claims themselves. If its guilt has not been established in a 
                                                        
57 The incentive to settle can be restored by a contribution rule that frees any settling defendant 
from future contribution liability. Some states apply such rules to tort defendants who settle in 
good faith. See West's Ann.Calif.Code Civ.Proc. § 877. This is in effect a no contribution rule for 
good faith settlors. 
 
Hovenkamp Antitrust Damages    February, 2011, Page 59 
 
prior proceeding to which it was a party, a defendant in a contribution case may still defend on the 
merits. A formula will still have to be developed for computing the relative liability of each co-
conspirator. One possibility, for example, is liability in proportion to market share. However, such 
a rule would force the parties to a contribution case to determine a relevant market and calculate 
each co-defendant's share of it, even though this determination may not have been made in the 
earlier proceeding. 
 
 Most arguments for a right of contribution in antitrust rest on the lack of fairness or justice 
in any rule that forces one guilty party to pay for the offenses of another party who is equally 
guilty. If consumer welfare and efficiency are the principle goals of antitrust, however, the current 
rule of no right of contribution among antitrust defendants may be a good one, for it achieves the 
same total level of deterrence and reduces litigation costs. 
 
 Finally, antitrust also follows the common law tort rule of joint and several liability, which 
means that each guilty defendant is responsible for the entire damage award if co-defendants are 
unable to pay. This means that a direct purchaser who made all of its purchases from cartel 
member A could in fact collect some or even all of its damages from cartel members B and C.58 
 
                                                        
58 See Paper Systems v. Nippon Paper Indus., 281 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir.2002). 
